Daniel Matthew Matlock v. United States
Whether the term 'knowingly' in 18 U.S.C. § 2242(1) applies only to 'causing another person to engage in a sexual act' or whether it extends also to 'threatening or placing that other person in fear'
This Cou rt has con sistently and repeatedly held that the term “knowi ngly” in a cri minal statute must apply to all of the elements of the crime that make the defendant’s con duct criminal, i.e., the elements that evince a “ vicious will” as distinguished from otherwise innocen t conduct. The question presen ted is: Wh ether the term “knowingly” in 18 U .S.C. § 2242( 1) (sexu al abuse) applies on ly to “causing another person to engage i n a sexu al act” or wh ether it extends also to “threat ening or p lacing that other person in fear.”