Whether the Supreme Court should clarify the 'severe or pervasive' standard for hostile work environment claims under Title VII to ensure uniform national protection

1. Clarification of the “Severe or Pervasive ” Standard. Title VII prohibits discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment ” because of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), and Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), this Court held that a hostile work environment exists when harassment is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment. ” The circuits, however, apply this standard inconsistently: some require extreme or repeated conduct, while others allow juries to consider fewer but severe incidents or persistent gender-based slurs. Question U Whether this Court should clarify or modify the “severe or pervasive ” standard to ensure uniform national protection under Title VII. 2. Entrenched Circuit Conflict. The Eighth Circuit in Paskert v. Kemna ASA Auto Plaza, Inc., 950 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2020), held that repeated sexist remarks and unwanted touching were not actionable, while the Seventh Circuit in Passananti v. Cook County, 689 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2012), held that repeated use of the word “bitch ” could establish a hostile environment. The First {Gerald v. Univ. ofP.R., 707 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2013)) and Ninth Circuits {Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991)) have likewise adopted broader approaches. Question 2Whether review is warranted to resolve the entrenched circuit split regarding the application of Title VIPs “severe or pervasive ” standard. 1 3. Contradictory Jury Verdict. At trial, the jury found that petitioner endured repeated intentional sexual batteries, awarding both compensatory and punitive damages, yet rejected her Title VII hostile work environment claim. This outcome cannot be reconciled with Meritor, Harris, and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), which recognize that unwanted sexual touching is harassment “because of sex. ” Question 3: Whether a jury may lawfully find intentional sexual battery while simultaneously denying a Title VII hostile work environment claim arising from the same conduct, and whether courts must correct such contradictions to preserve the integrity of anti-discrimination law. 4. Miscarriage of Justice in Damages. Despite overwhelming medical evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder, repeated hospitalizations, long-term psychiatric treatment, and permanent disability, the jury awarded only $50,000 in compensatory damages —far below comparable awards such as Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2014) ($1.32 million). The District Court compounded the error by attributing petitioner ’s condition to decades-old spousal abuse, unsupported by medical evidence. Question 4* Whether such a grossly inadequate award constitutes a miscarriage of justice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, and whether due process is violated when verdicts rest on speculation rather than evidence. 2 5. Systemic Retaliation in Federally Funded Institutions. Petitioner, an immigrant woman of color and cancer researcher, was retaliated against and silenced at a federally funded cancer research institution. Her career, dedicated to curing disease, was destroyed through harassment, retaliation, and institutional falsehoods. Question 5* Whether this Court should grant review to address systemic retaliation against whistleblowers and vulnerable employees in federally funded STEM institutions, where unchecked misconduct not only silences truth-tellers but also undermines public trust in science and deprives society of critical discoveries. 6. Waiver, Forfeiture, and Access to Justice. The Second Circuit concluded that petitioner had “waived ” all grounds for a new trial except damages, despite the fact that her post-trial motions raised those issues. Waiver requires the intentional relinquishment of a known right, whereas mere forfeiture is the failure to timely assert one. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). By treating preserved issues