Whether the Mississippi Supreme Court's application of a new procedural rule to a pending postconviction motion constitutes an adequate state ground barring federal review of a conflict of interest claim

Petitioner and his brother were adversely situated codefendants in two separate felony cases over which the same judge presided. That judge appointed Wallace Stuckey to represent petitioner in the underlying capital trial and to represent the codefendant in the non-capital trial without addressing the risk of a conflict of interests caused by Stuckey’s simultaneous representation. Petitioner was convicted in both cases and was sentenced to death in the underlying capital case, where his noncapital conviction established his eligibility for the death penalty. Petitioner failed to challenge this conflict of interests in initial state postconviction proceedings. More than a decade ago, Mississippi recognized a constitutional right to the effective assistance of capital postconviction counsel. This created a gateway for raising claims in a successive postconviction motion that initial postconviction counsel had failed to raise. Relying on this right, petitioner raised the conflict claim in a successive postconviction motion. After raising the claim, Mississippi ruled in a different case that its constitution did not guarantee the effective assistance of postconviction counsel. Applying this new case to petitioner’s pending motion, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied the conflict claim as procedurally barred while also ruling that it lacked merit. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the Mississippi Supreme Court’s application of its new rule to petitioner’s pending motion is a state ground that is adequate to deprive this Court of jurisdiction over the federal conflict claim. 2. Whether Stuckey’s simultaneous representation of petitioner and his codefendant violated Holloway v. Arkansas , 435 U.S. 475 (1978).