Whether the FAA preempts a state court rule permitting a proposed class representative to effectively opt out of arbitration on behalf of all unnamed class members notwithstanding contrary, express requirements in the arbitration agreement

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) “requires courts to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.” Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P ’ship v. Clark , 581 U.S. 246, 248 (2017) . This Court has repeatedly applied that princip le to invalidate state court rules that “apply only to arbitratio n,” id. at 251, or that allow parties to an arbitration agreement to “abrogate th at agreement after the fact. ” Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana , 596 U.S. 639, 650 (2022) . In Bickerstaff v. Suntrust Bank , 788 S.E.2d 787 (2016) (Bickerstaff II) , the Georgia Supreme Court nullified a provision in SunTrust’s deposit agreement requiring individual customers to provide timely and particularized written notice to opt out of arbitration. The court held that by filing a class -action lawsuit, the plaintiff had effectively opted out of arbitration not only for himself , but for thousands of unnamed class members . Federal courts have declined to endorse th at reasoning , recognizing that “[a]n arbitration -specific rule, such as the one set forth in B ickerstaff , would be preempted by the FAA. ” O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc. , 904 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2018) . But in the decision below, the Georgia Court of Appeals doubled down, broadening Bickerstaff II to reach even those class members whose agreements expressly prohibit opting out via lawsuit. The Georgia Supreme Court subsequently denied review . The question presented is: Whether the F AA preempts a state court rule permitting a proposed class representative to effectively opt out of arbitration on behalf of all unnamed class member s notwithstanding contrary , express requirements in the arbitration agreement .