Question not identified.

No question identified. : QUESTIONS P RESENTED F OR REVIEW The Court has made clear that the district courts have wide discretion to manag e their dockets and case load, to schedule trials, and g rant or deny continuances. Morris v. Slappy , 461 U.S. 1, 11, 103 S. Ct. 1610 (1983). B ut a denial of a request for more time to defend a case can violate the F ifth Amendment rig hts to due process and the Six th Amendment rig ht to counsel. Ungar v. Sarafite , 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S. Ct. 841 (1964); Avery v. Alabama , 308 U.S. 444, 446, 60 S. Ct. 321 (1940). The Court’s precedent establishes that both defendants and the public have an interest in a speedy trial. See Barker v. W ingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972). B ut the Court is equally clear that both defendants and the public have an interest in a sy stem that is fair and reliable, which must often come at the ex pense of haste. Vermont v. Brillon , 556 U.S. 81, 89, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009); Beavers v. Haubert , 198 U.S. 77, 86, 25 S. Ct. 573 (1905). I n short, reliability and fairness are more important than the efficiency of a District Court’s docket. In this case, the District Court g ave Petitioner a notice allowing him only 15 day s to file pretrial motions. Petitioner’s first counsel filed no pretrial motions in that time. The District Court appointed Petitioner new counsel. Thus, new counsel entered the case after the District Court’s period for filing pretrial motions had already expired. Despite several motions for continuances from both parties, at no time did the District Court allow any additional time for defense motions to be filed. The Government took substantial time to provide new counsel with the discovery that showed g rounds for a fourth amendment challeng e. But with the pretrial motion already in the rearview mirror, new counsel focused on attempting to resolve the matter throug h plea neg otiations. Only once the plea neg otiations surprising ly broke down did Petitioner’s new counsel file a motion for continuance and motion for leave to file a sing le suppression motion based on a viable fourth amendment challeng e. The circuit majority recog nized and listed several of Petitioner’s g rounds for seeking leave to file a suppression motion. Nevertheless, the Majority blamed appellate counsel for failing to develop an arg ument that Petitioner had g ood cause to file an untimely motion. Pet. App. 8. The Majority reached the merits any way, putting on blinders to ig nore all other factors, and distilling Petitioner’ several g ood causes down to one—that second counsel “consciously decided” to not file a pretrial motion by the deadline in an attempt to curry favor with the prosecution in plea neg otiations.” Pet. App. 8. B ut no attorney for Petitioner consciously decided against filing a motion by any deadline. F irst counsel had just 15 day s. The District Court refused to ex tend that deadline. The District Court appointed second counsel after the deadline passed. Moreover, here in a sy stem of pleas, rather than trials, the District Court ruling discourag es plea negotiation and invites the filing of needless pretrial motions. The questions for the Court are whether, under these circumstances, the District Court erred in refusing to grant a continuance of trial and leave to file a sing le suppression motion and whether the Six th Circuit Majority erred in affirming that decision. i