1. Whether the Oklahoma courts ' categorical refusal
to grant evidentiary hearings on colorable claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, actual innocence,
and disproportionate sentencing conflicts with this
Court 's precedents and violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Specifically,
whether a state court may summarily deny factual
development and evidentiary hearings when a
petitioner presents detailed affidavits and credible
evidence supporting constitutional claims, in direct
tension with decisions such as Machibroda v. United
States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962), Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293 (1963), and Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63 (1977).

2. Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
imposition of extreme sentences —such as life
imprisonment plus consecutive terms —on youthful
offenders aged 18 to 20 who did not personally kill,
intend to kill, or have prior criminal history. This
question implicates the Court 's precedents recognizing
the diminished culpability of youth and the heightened
potential for rehabilitation, including Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

3. Whether sentencing a non-shooter more harshly
than the admitted triggerman violates constitutional
principles of proportionality under the Eighth
Amendment and equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
This question arises where an 18-year-old, first-time
offender receives the most severe possible sentence
despite not pulling the trigger, while the admitted
shooter receives a lesser sentence, raising serious
concerns about fairness, justice, and uniformity in
the imposition of criminal punishment.

Whether the Oklahoma courts' categorical refusal to grant evidentiary hearings on colorable claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, actual innocence, and disproportionate sentencing conflicts with this Court's precedents and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?