Whether prison policies restricting a prisoner's First Amendment rights and property interests can be challenged without fully defining the scope of the policy's restrictions

1) When considering the suppression of a prisoner's First Amendment right to freedom of expression and association by a prison policy, is it possible to guage if the policy is too broad sweeping without determining what the policy covers? 2) Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determine what new material was covered by the broadened definition of sexually explicit image in the newly revised prison policy as its colleagues did in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals with a materially and factually indistinguishable prison policy? 3) If a prisoner possesses personal property, whether by right or privilege, does he enjoy a protected interest in that property that cannot be infringed^ on without due process under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 4) If prison administrators implement a new policy that retroactively makes legally possessed property contraband, does the prisoner retain ownership of the property if it is ultimately confiscated by prison officials? 5) If a prisoner's protected interest in legally possessed property translates to ownership, and cannot be infringed upon without due process, should there be additional safeguards in regards to the disposition of the property if it is confiscated pursuant to prison policy? 6) If a supervisory official may be held liable under §1983 for his personal involvement ■in a constitutional deprivation, is his role as a top official that created and/or implemented prison policy which unconstitutional practices occurred enough to establish a sufficient causal connection?