1. Recusal and Void Orders
Whether the Due Process Clause and the Supremacy Clause permit a state judge to
continue issuing substantive custody, contempt, and support orders after formal
recusal, and whether federal courts may summarily affirm such orders where they
are void ab initio yet stripped Petitioner of joint custody and imposed financial
obligations based on projected income. Although lower courts purport to follow
uniform standards, in practice they apply self-protective and inconsistent
interpretations —treating post-recusal acts as valid in direct conflict with this
Court's precedent, thereby creating an appearance of division that demands
resolution.

2. ADA Retaliation and Denial of Accommodations
Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12132) and the
Fourteenth Amendment protect pro se litigants with traumatic-brain-injury
disabilities from retaliation and denial of accommodations in state-court
proceedings, including transcript obstruction, selective fee enforcement, and
exclusion from meaningful participation. Courts nationwide apply inconsistent
standards to ADA enforcement in judicial settings, leaving disabled litigants subject
to arbitrary access barriers.

3. Transcript Obstruction and Meaningful Appellate Review
Whether selective production or suppression of trial transcripts by state courts
deprives an appellant of due process and meaningful appellate review under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although jurisdictions purport to follow this Court's
decisions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S.
487 (1963); and M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996), they apply those precedents
inconsistently or avoid them altogether, creating an appearance of division over
whether transcript access is constitutionally required in civil and family cases
involving fundamental parental rights.

Whether a state judge can issue substantive orders after formal recusal and whether federal courts can affirm void orders