Whether the District Court erred by failing to recognize substantive actual innocence claims under habeas corpus and exercise its equitable authority to bypass AEDPA limitations

1) Did the District Court error by failing to recognizing substantive claims as cognizable under habeas corpus and failing to exercise its equitable au thority to bypass the limitations of 28 USCS § 2244(d)? Then in turn not determin ing the merits of the constitutional violations inherent in the petitioner's substantive innocence claim? 2) Did the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit error by denying the petitioner's application for a certificate of appealability by failing to recognized the District Court's error as presented above? 3) As it is not controversial that substantive actual innocence claims are cognizable under habeas corpus jurisprudence (Hill v United States, Davis v United States, Jones v Hendrix^, does the habeas court have a primary duty to re solve this issue of substantive actual innocence prior to any consideration of re strictions created in the Anti-terrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)? Because a substantive claim of actual innocence is binary in nature, either true or false, does the court have an primary initial obligation to resolve the merits of the claim? 1 Hill, 368 US 424, Davis, 417 US 333, Jones, 599 US 455 2 4) Given the holdings in Herrera v Collins 506 US 390, 404, 113 SCT 853 does the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to see that federal con stitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons obligated the habeas court to review a substantive actual innocence claim on the merits? 5) Is there a statutory tension between the requirements of 28 USCS § 2243 and § 2244? Can the non-jurisdictional character of 2244(d)(1) supersede the mandate of Congress incorporated within 2243? Does the obligation of Herrera underpin a substantive duty within 2243? Does the “shall ” command requiring summary judgments of law and justice control in the context of adjudicating a sub stantive claim of innocence which is itself a question of law? Does the law defin ing the substantive claim control over the law of § 2244? 5) If a court is presented with a substantive actual innocence claim in which, 1) the facts are not in dispute, and 2) the controlling law is to be construed as true absent credible contravention by the respondent, 3) then the liberty interests and substantive rights of the petitioner are a matter of this question of law. Is the court obligated to answer the question through a summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12 governing habeas corpus proceedings? 3 6) If true, a substantive claim would inherently incorporate constitutional and structural errors. In past precedent this Court has held that such errors require automatic reversal. In the post-AEDPA era does this still apply?