Did the Seventh Circuit lack jurisdiction to deny qualified immunity by rewriting the factual record and creating an emergency exception to investigation requirements?

This section 1983 civil rights case arises from the devastating consequences of medical and investigative errors in a child protection proceeding. After a twomonth-old infant suffered severe brain damage during a botched intubation at a local hospital—an event witnessed by his mother, Dr. Erika Mabes, a surgeon—a child abuse pediatrician and Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) workers refused to investigate or even consider the medical records documenting these iatrogenic injuries, i.e., injuries caused by medical care. Instead, they immediately concluded the infant had been abused, blamed Dr. Mabes simply because she was “the mother”, seized all three children without a warrant or court order, and pursued administrative charges for over two years until DCS finally conceded it lacked evidence to support any allegations against Dr. Mabes. The district court denied qualified immunity, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Respondents engaged in a sham investigation by ignoring the exculpatory evidence and whether there was an emergency justifying the warrantless removal of the children. The Seventh Circuit reversed by disputing the district court’s factual findings and requiring precedent so specific that no constitutional violation could ever be clearly established. The questions presented are: 1. Did the Seventh Circuit lack jurisdiction under Johnson v. Jones , 515 U.S. 304 (1995), to deny qualified immunity on summary judgment by rewriting the factual record to deny that there was a sham investigation and to create an “emergency” excusing Respondents’ refusal to ii investigate Petitioners’ exculpatory explanations before concluding abuse had occurred? 2. Does the decision below—immunizing state actors who ignore readily verifiable exculpatory evidence in non-emergency that this Court’s “clearly established law” jurisprudence has become unworkable and requires clarification, particularly regarding whether the qualified immunity doctrine should apply differently when officials have ample time to investigate rather than split seconds to act?