Whether a superseding indictment cures a malicious prosecution claim under the Chiaverini standard and bars damages for an invalid initial charge

A. Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556 (2024) held that the presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment claim relating to another, baseless charge. In Sanchez’ case the initial charging document (criminal complaint) contained two charges, one of which was a charge without probable cause (hereinafter “Chiaverini violation”). An indictment invalid due to misrepresentations to the Grand Jury was “cured” by a su perseding indictment filed a year later containing only the charge with probable cause. The questions presented under Chiaverini are as follows: Whether a FTCA malicious prosecution claim under the holding of Chiaverini is barred by a superseding indictment (without the invalid charge) filed more than a year after the initiation of the criminal prosecution? Are damages allowed for the time between the “Chiaverini violation” and the superseding indictment filed a year later? Does the “Chiaverini violation” survive an allegedly curative superseding indictment, allowing for damages even after said filing? -i B. In compliance with the FTCA notice requirements, Sanchez sent SF95s to the US Attorney for Puerto Rico and the US CBP main office. The US CBP denied having received the SF95. The US Attorney did receive the SF95. The FTCA related question is: Whether notice under 28 U.S.C. §2401(b) is complied with when the US Attorney receives notice of the FTCA claims and fails to forward same as required by 28 C.F.R. §14.2(b)(1). -ii