Did the Ninth Circuit's summary denial of a Certificate of Appealability (COA) so clearly misapply Buck's standard for granting a COA as to call for reversal and remand?

Petitio ner Demetrius Franklin was convicted of first degree murder based on the testimony of a single identifying witness , Shanti Day. The prosecution failed to discl ose the following material and favorable evidence to Franklin : Day’s felony charge was reduced to a misdemeanor on the same day that Franklin was charged with first degree murder; the investigating officers provided assistance to Day in fighting her felony charge; and an officer from the homicide bureau wrote a letter to the presiding judge in Day’s criminal case requesting that the fine levied against her be dropped. But w hen presented with this evidence , the state court failed to perform the proper analysis this Court required in Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the district court held that even if the prosecution should have disclosed the evidence regarding the only identifying witness , Franklin had not shown that the evidence was material. The Ninth Circuit then summarily denied even a certificate of appealability (“COA”) , effectively deeming these decisions “not even debatable.” Buck v. Davis , 580 U.S. 100, 116 (2017). The question presented is thus: d id the Ninth Circuit’s summary denial of a COA here so clearly misapply Buck ’s modest standard for granting a COA as to call for reversal and remand?