Whether a federal court can review a state court's habeas corpus claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 when the state court's factual determinations are undermined by clear and convincing evidence

1.1 n applying Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) to a Habeas Corpus Claim based on the State's unreasonable application of "characterized misstated of material fact by the prosecutor ” in violation of 28 U.S.C & 2254 (d)(1), is there a reasonable probability that "prosecutor's misstated of the evidence so infected the trial with unfairness as to making conviction a denial of due Process" on the basis of facts which are, pursuant to subdivision (e)(1), undermined by clear and convincing evidence in the State Court record? 2. In applying Jackson v. Virginia 443 U.S. 307 (1979 ) to a Habeas Corpus claim based on the State's unreasonable application of "Sufficiency of Evidence" in violation of 28 U.S.C & 2254 (d) (1), can petitioner be convicted when no elements of the crime were proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the facts which have been unreasonable determined by the State Courts, in violation of subsection (d)(2) ? 3. In applying Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2001) to a habeas corpus claim based on the unreasonable application of the Constitutional Standard for "Effective Assistance of Counsel" in violation of 28 U.S.C & 2254 (d) (1), can the Federal Court "Hypothesize" about Reasonable Judgment for "Tactical Choices" trial counsel might have made on the basis of facts which are pursuant subdivision (e)(1), undermined by clear and convincing evidence in the State Court Record? 4. In applying Strickland and Richter to a Habeas Corpus claim based on the State's unreasonable application of the Constitutional Standard for "Effective Assistance of Counsel" in violation of 28 U.S.C & 2254 (d)(1), can the Federal Court determine trial's counsel "Performance" as of "adequate pre-trial investigation, interview of witnesses, prosecutor's witnesses, cross examination, objections to evidence and inadmissible evidence " trial counsel might have made on the basis of facts which have been unreasonable determined by the State Courts, in violation of subsection (d)(2)? 5. In applying Strickland to a Habeas Corpus Claim based on the State's unreasonable application For "assessing the prejudice from trial Counsel's Cumulative Errors and Omissions" in violation of 28 U.S.C & 2254 (d)(1), is there a reasonable probability that absent "counsel's Errors and Omissions" the Factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting to guilt basis on the facts which have been unreasonable determined by the State Courts, in violation of subsection (d)(2)? * 1/