Did the lower courts commit plain error by reinterpreting the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 to criminalize a law-abiding modus operandi of moving between states?

Did the lower courts commit plain error requiring summary reversal by reinterpreting the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 , (construed by the unanimous Supreme Court panel in Nichols v. United States , 578 U.S. 104, 136 S. Ct. 1113, 194 L. Ed. 2d 324 (2016),) to thereby criminalize a law-abiding modus operandi of never staying longer than state law allows unregistered visitors and moving on? Question Presented: Is the term “habitually lives ” merely ambiguous in isolation, or subject to the rule of lenity, in any regard, because the Attorney General was not delegated specific authority to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 2250 in compliance with judicial canons and lacked the expertise required to provide Skidmore deference postLoper Bright ? 11 PARTIES TO PROCEEDING 1: The United States of America, Represented by Respondents: Office of the Solicitor General 950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 (202) 514-2203 Eleanor F. Hurney (Assistant U.S. Attorney) 300 Third Street, Suite #300 Elkins, WV 26241 2: Pro Se, Petitioner Jason Steven Kokinda 1631 Wesel Blvd., #1079 Hagerstown, MD 21740 (609)-942-9012 II. LIST OF ALL DIRECTLY