1. I filed with an IFP motion; the court found me indigent (including for counsel recruitment). I moved for service under FRCP 4(c)(3), but the district court refused despite granting IFP status, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rule 4(c)(3) says the court "must " order service for IFP plaintiffs (contrasting with "may" for others). Does "must so order " in FRCP 4(c)(3) require a district court to order service upon request by a plaintiff allowed to proceed in forma pauperis?

2. The district court 's first order applied outdated Rule 23 text, deferred screening, and decided adequacy against me via a per se rule against pro se adequacy. What followed was months of inquisition-like proceedings that departed from principles of party presentation, where I was denied tools routinely available to non-indigents (including without limitation access to discovery). Does the law require that indigent persons not be legally disabled by the courts compared with non-indigents for litigating rule 23 issues or other questions, in cases where their positions would survive screening? Is imposing wealth based disparate access to discovery procedure error?

3. Authorities describe adequacy as circumstance-dependent and fact-bound (e.g., Wright & Miller; Amchem (Breyer)). This Court has warned against treating fact-bound determinations as "made uniform " by appellate review (e.g., Cooter & Gelt, Price v. Johnston). Here, adequacy was decided categorically against me based on factual determinations from other cases rather than facts developed in mine. Is FRCP 23(a)(4) adequacy a fact-bound determination; and if so, do the limits described in Cooter & Gell and Price v. Johnston prohibit categorical adequacy pre-determination based on appellate decisions in prior cases?

4. The district court said it could not recruit counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 because, although indigent, I was competent to manage my case; some Seventh Circuit phrasing is read as restricting discretion even when the sole statutory requirement of indigency is satisfied. May a district court recruit pro bono counsel for an indigent litigant who is otherwise capable of managing their case?

5. A central claim on appeal was that the district court failed to recognize discretion to allow representative capacity (and thus committed legal error). I argued that the court could admit a person to its bar during a case, thereby mooting representational-capacity objections, via inherent power, special rules, immediate-need practice, writs (e.g., attornato), or otherwise. Do district courts have discretion to admit persons as attorneys during an ongoing case (by inherent power, special rules, writs, or otherwise); and is that discretion dependent on local rules or the court 's chosen admission mechanism?

6. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the refusal to order FRCP 4(c)(3) service and denied rehearing despite clear legal error. District courts "abuse discretion " by definition when they commit an error of law; similar language is scarce for appeals courts. Do courts of appeals, by definition, abuse discretion by committing error of law (and if not harmless, is such error reversible)?

7. The Seventh Circuit declined to reach most of my arguments by dismissing them as "insufficiently developed, " despite my reliance on statutes and quotations from precedent, including numerous SCOTUS cases. My arguments appear to have been dismissed thusly because the court did not feel like reconciling

Whether a district court must order service under FRCP 4(c)(3) for an indigent plaintiff who has been granted in forma pauperis status