Does California's doctrine of judicial exhaustion violate the Supremacy Clause under Williams v. Reed?

All proceedings conducted pursuant to the California Administrative Procedures Act are subject to a doctrine of “judicial exhaustion ”; a party may not file in state court a lawsuit attacking the unconstitutionality of state administrative proceedings until after the completion of the administrative proceedings and exhaustion of the exclusive judicial remedy, an administrative petition for writ of mandamus proceeding. Prior to 2024 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied this same doctrine to 42 U.S.C. §1983 lawsuits in federal court, but in Jamgotchian v. Ferraro, 93 F.4th 1150 (9th Cir. 2024) it acknowledged this was mistaken and overruled the prior authority. However, in this case, involving an attack on then on-going administrative proceedings before the California Department of Real Estate (“DRE ”) that were dismissed on Younger abstention grounds, oral argument occurred prior to publication by this Court of Williams v. Reed, 145 S.Ct. 465 (2025). Petitioner notified the panel of this decision by Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(j) letter and thereafter requested supplemental briefing on its effects which was denied, and the panel refused to engage with relevant Seventh Circuit authority. Petitioner therefore presents the following: 1. Does California ’s doctrine of judicial exhaustion violate the Supremacy Clause under Williams v. Reed, 145 S.Ct. 465 (2025)? 2. If so, does this Supremacy Clause violation invalidate the California DRE reciprocal disciplinary ii proceeding based on the Supremacy Clause violating California State Bar proceedings? 3. Does a Supremacy Clause violating proceeding fail to meet the requirements for the application of Younger abstention, as the Seventh Circuit held in SKS & Associates, Inc. v. Dart, 619 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2010)? 4. Should this Court resolve the circuit conflict between the Ninth Circuit ’s opinion in this action and SKS, supra? 5. Were the DRE proceedings invalid because there was no right to a jury even though such proceedings would be deemed legal in the courts of England in 1791 and financial penalties and restitution can be ordered thereunder?