1. Must federal habeas courts reweigh the "totality of available mitigating evidence," Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003), when deciding penalty phase prejudice claims pursuant to enumerated grounds for deficient performance?

2. In such ineffectiveness claims, is "cumulative prejudice" a distinct claim for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 exhaustion purposes or Wiggins reweighing?

3. Under Indiana's juror deadlock provision, Ind. Code § 35–50–2–9(f), does a reasonable likelihood under evidentiary reweighing that at least one juror would strike a different balance and vote against a death sentence amount to a "different outcome" under Wiggins?

Whether federal habeas courts must reweigh the totality of available mitigating evidence when deciding penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and whether cumulative prejudice constitutes a distinct claim for exhaustion and prejudice analysis purposes