I.
Whether the Michigan Supreme Court's affirmation of Petitioner's conviction for first-degree felony murder, following an acquittal of first-degree premeditated murder, for a single killing, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, particularly in light of this Court's recent decision in McElwrath v. Georgia, 144 S. Ct. 651 (2024)

II.
Whether Michigan's application of MCL 750.316(b) to allow a conviction for first-degree felony murder after an acquittal for first-degree premeditated murder for the same killing creates an unconstitutional presumption of premeditation, deliberation, or malice, or impermissibly shifts the burden of proof as to intent to the defendant, thereby violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as articulated in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)

III.
Whether a state criminal conviction which is based on a jury verdict rendered via a defective verdict form that (1) fails to provide a clear option for a general verdict of not guilty on the charged offenses, and (2) is unaccompanied by any jury instructions, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

IV.
Whether a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, as established in Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984), is violated when trial counsel fails to object to the admission of privileged marital communications, which constituted the sole evidence linking the defendant to the crime, in contravention of the marital communication privilege recognized under federal common law and incorporated by the states, particularly where such testimony comes from an estranged spouse with a clear motive to fabricate, and where an objection by counsel would have likely resulted in the exclusion of the testimony, thereby changing the outcome of the trial.

Question not identified.