After succeeding in vacating a 40 year sentence on §2255, Naseer had the remainder of his terms restructured to increase his term of incarceration. This was done with none of the requirements of due process - appointment of counsel, hearing, or a new P.S.R. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this as a "purely ministerial" sentence "correction."

What is the difference between a "sentencing correction," which does not require a hearing, and a "resentencing," which does? Where is the line between them?

Should a judge on §2255 be able to increase or restructure remaining counts after vacatur without a hearing?

Whether a judge may increase or restructure a defendant's remaining sentences after vacatur of other counts under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 without a hearing, counsel, or updated presentence report, and what constitutional distinction exists between a 'sentencing correction' and 'resentencing' requiring due process protections