Whether a local police officer wielding both state and federal authority can act under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983

Section 1983 guarantees that “[e]very person” who violates an individual’s constitutional rights “under color of any statute, ordina nce, custom, or usage, of any State * * * shall be liable.” 42 U.S.C. 1983. Respondent St. Paul Po lice Officer Heather Weyker framed Petitioner Hamdi Mohamud for a crime, causing Mohamud (then a minor) to spend two years in prison. At the time, We yker was cross-deputized with narrow federal authority, so Mohamud asserted causes of action against her under both Section 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Eighth Circuit recognized that Mohamud’s rights were clearly established, but it held in 2020 that she may not sue under Bivens . In its opinion below, the Eighth Circuit held that Mohamud may not sue under Sec-tion 1983, either. In doing so, the court deepened a circuit split over how to apply this Court’s state-action doctrine and left Mohamud remediless. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a local police officer wielding both state and federal authority can act under color of state law for purpos es of 42 U.S.C. 1983. 2. If not, whether a local police officer acting with federal authority is subject to a Bivens cause of action for Fourth Amendment violations she commits in the common and recurrent sphere of domestic law enforcement.