Whether the undefined statutory language 'intangible right of honest services' in 18 U.S.C. § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague

I. Whether the undefined statutory language, “intangible right of honest services,” in 18 U.S.C. § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague. II. Whether the undefined statutory terms, “fictitious sale” and “not a true and bona fide price,” in 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a) are unconstitutionally vague. III. Whether the government’s criminal prosecution of petitioner for insider-trading under 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 – the first such prosecution in the United States – violates due process because ordinary people were not on fair notice at the time of the charged offense that § 9(1) and § 180.1 made insider-trading in the commodity futures context a criminal offense. I V. Whether the criminal prosecution of petitioner under § 9(1) and § 180.1 violates the doctrine because (1) Congress may not constitutionally delegate to an executive agency the power to define what primary conduct is subject to criminal liability and (2) § 9(1) does not provide an intelligible principle for delegation of legislative authority to define criminal conduct to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.