Whether 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) exceeds the constitutional limits of Congress's powers insofar as it permits the federal government to civilly commit a person who has not been convicted of a federal offense and whose federal criminal charge has already been dismissed

Congress has enacted several statutes that collectively provide for the involuntary civil commitment of certain individuals in “the custody” of the federal government. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a); see also §§ 42414248. In United States v. Comstock , 560 U.S. 126 (2010), this Court examined the statutory scheme and concluded that Congress did not trespass constitutional limits in enacting the scheme because “[a]s the Solicitor General repeatedly confirmed at oral argument,” the statutes’ “reach is limited to individuals already ‘in the custody of the’ Federal Government.” Id. at 148. All parties thus agreed that, unless a person is “either charged with or convicted of” a federal offense, the federal government cannot commit him. Id. at 138. Anything more would “confer[] on Congress a general ‘police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States.’” Id. at 148. Petitioner Duane Letroy Berry stands neither charged with nor convicted of a federal offense. Yet the federal government sought and obtained his commitment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the commitment order because Berry had previously been charged with a crime, and despite the charge’s dismissal months prior to his commitment, Berry remained in the federal government’s physical custody. The question presented is: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) exceeds the constitutional limits of Congress’s powers insofar as it permits the federal government to civilly commit a person who ii has not been convicted of a federal offense and whose federal criminal charge has already been dismissed.