Whether the Eleventh Circuit improperly reversed a district court's denial of qualified immunity by relying on potentially false or suppressed evidence in an excessive force case

1. Whether Petitioner Heid’s two grounds for challenging the arresting officers’ defense of qualified immunity defense constitute a valid “Franks challenge” pursuant to this Court’s holding in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)!? 2. Whether the Eleventh Circuit evaded Heid’s “Franks challenge” and, as such, must be reversed and remanded? w*Ke* In an excessive use of force case, an arresting officer may establish a defense of qualified immunity only on the basis of evidence that is competent or admissible and objectively reasonable. Here the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s finding the arresting officers were not entitled to qualified immunity, but it did so without relying upon competent or admissible evidence or evidence that is objectively reasonable. First, the arresting officer’s qualified immunity defenses are based upon sworn affidavits that are false, or were made with callous indifference toward truth.2 1 This issue goes to the heart of the law of American evidence jurisprudence. See, e.g., Fed. R. E. 101 (purpose) and 102 (scope). It also goes to the heart of The Civil War Amendments—i.e., the prohibition of tyrannical abuse, involuntary servitude, and the like; as well as the nature of police misconduct being enabled through tyrannical manipulation of material evidence. 2 See, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). ii Second, the arresting officer’s qualified immunity defense gives rise to a reasonable inference of Brady/ Giglio “evidence suppression” violations.? Relying on these two grounds, Petitioner Heid has vigorously impeached the arresting officers’ qualified immunity defense in written briefings or oral argument at the district court and Eleventh Circuit. Nevertheless, without addressing these two grounds, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying the arresting officer’s claim of qualified immunity. 3 See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-154 (1972); Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263 (1999). These violations are the subject of pending litigation in two state courts. See, Pet. at iii.