Whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §1343 must be vacated where the Government obtained a verdict under a theory materially broader than the indictment, potentially violating constitutional charging and jury determination requirements

1. Whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §1343 must be vacated where the Government obtained a verdict under a theory materially broader than the in dictment-permitting conviction without a finding of personal authorship or submission of the charged digital communication —thereby constructively amen ding the indictment and displacing the grand jury ’s charging function in violation of the Fifth Amendment and this Court ’s decisions in Stirone v. United States and Ex parte Bain? 2. Whether the judgment is void where the district court withheld from the jury essential factual determinations concerning identity and authorship of a charged digital submission, and the jury was permitted to convict without deciding who committed the charged act, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and this Court ’s decisions in United States v. Gaudin and Sullivan v. Louisiana? 3. Whether dismissal of the indictment is requireed where the grand jury was presented with materially inaccurate or misleading testimony concerning identity and authorship, the Government possessed contradictory information, and the district court evaluated the defect under an incorrect legal standard rather than the “substantial influence ” test required by Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, implicating due process under Mooney v. Holohan and Napue v. Illinois? ii 4. Whether the Government violated Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United States, and Kyles v. Whitley by failing to obtain and disclose attribution relevant digital records held by cooperating admini strative agencies in a prosecution turning on digital authorship and identity, and whether federal courts are divided on the scope of prosecutors ’ disclosure duties in interagency digital-evidence cases? 5. Whether structural error occurs where a criminal prosecution turning on complex digital evidence was conducted in a manner that collectively prevented constitutionally adequate adversarial testing —due to judicial conduct affecting neutrality, restrictions on jury function, and disability-based barriers that denied a legally blind defendant meaningful access to digital evidence —in violation of the Due Process Clause, the Sixth Amendment, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act?