Whether a district court has discretionary authority to grant or withhold fundamental due process rights in criminal proceedings

1) This Court holds a defendant ’s right to plead guilty knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently in highest regard and comes back to it once every decade. Bousley v. US, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) is a monumental case in those series. Yet, district courts and federal circuits are split as to whether a district court has “discretion ” to grant, or withhold from, a criminal defendant the very fundamental due process rights discussed in Bousley. Does a district court or any court to that matter have such discretionary authority? 2) After this Court ’s decision in US v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), the circuits diverge in defining and applying the Coram Nobis jurisdictional requirement of “civil disability. ” Some circuits say even the need to clear one ’s name satisfies this requirement. Others require substantially more. And in some courts, as in this petitioner ’s case, the district court acknowledged existence of a genuine on-going “civil disability ” but denied jurisdiction under Coram Nobis per its discretion. Which one of these three approaches is correct determination of “civil disability ” for Morgan and Coram Nobis purposes. 3) In Bousley, this Court instructed that in order to show “actual innocence ” after a retroactive substantive ruling from this Court, a former criminal defendant has to show they are actually innocent of “more serious charges. ” Post Bousley, the circuits have diverged drastically; some circuits have expanded this plain text to both “equally serious ” and “more serious ” charges. In some others, such as the petitioner ’s case, the district court entirely refused to take on Bousely ’s analysis (comparison of seriousness of forgone charges) and called it discretionary. Which one of these three approaches is correct application of Bousley! ■ii‘ 4) For the purposes of Bousley ’s “more serious charges ” comparison, supra, the circuits are deeply divided. Some courts look only at the charges brought forth via a charging instrument (i.e. indictment, information, criminal complaint) and some courts go beyond the charges brought forth and look into the case record guilty plea agreements, correspondences, post-hoc affidavits, etc. Which one of these two approaches is correct application of Bousley and its definition of “forgone charges ”? 5) A former criminal defendant brings an “actual innocence ” claim under Bousley, after their guilty plea has been deemed constitutionally infirm, but their guilty plea agreement has a habeas challenge waiver. Some circuits consider actual innocence an exception to the waiver, and some let the waiver and the guilty plea stand. And in some courts, as this petitioner ’s case, the district court did not consider the waiver question, and deemed it within district court ’s discretion. Which one of these three approaches is correct application of “actual innocence ” to a habeas challenge waiver?