Whether a State may enact election laws that make success in a State-run party primary a mandatory prerequisite to appearing on the November general-election ballot, thereby converting the primary into an additional 'qualifying race' and stripping candidates and voters of their constitutional rights

1. Whether, under the Elections Clause, U.S. Constitution Article I § 4 Clause 1, and this Court’s decision in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), a State may enact or administer election laws that make success in a State-run party primary a mandatory prerequisite to appearing on the November general-election ballot for United States Senate or the House of Representatives, thereby converting the primary into an additional “qualifying race” and, through pervasive entwinement with non-government organizations (“NGOs”) commonly known as political parties, directly or indirectly stripping candidates and voters of their constitutional right to participate fully in and make choices at the only constitutional federal election in November. 2. Whether state officials who administer and certify a primary-based election scheme, whose conduct is challenged as constitutionally invalid on its face, may invoke Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and the Rule 12(b)(6) “plausibility” standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal to obtain dismissal at the pleading stage of a federal-question action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ex parte Young seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief from ongoing violations of the Elections Clause and the First Amendment, Ninth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendments; or whether, in light of the Eleventh Amendment’s limited role as a shield against suits by citizens of other States and foreign subjects, States must divest from automatically applying that Amendment to bar suits by their own citizens and courts must give constitutional validity precedence over plausibility-based dismissal. 3. Whether, consistent with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)—which holds that any statute or governmental act repugnant to the Constitution is void from its inception—courts adjudicating constitutional challenges to a State’s election scheme must interpret operative constitutional terms such as “manner,” “election,” “people,” “form,” and “method” according to their original public meaning as reflected in contemporaneous sources like Samuel Johnson’s 1778 Dictionary of the English Language and in light of Samuel Adams’s warning that “the tools of a tyrant pervert the plain meaning of words,” and, if the scheme or the precedents sustaining it are found repugnant to the Constitution, whether all subsequent judicial decisions and state actions that depend on that invalid foundation must themselves be treated as void, overruled, and reverted as if it never happened.