Whether the requirement in 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(B) that a relator have 'knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions' requires a distinct inquiry into whether the relator's non-public information meaningfully contributes to the government's understanding or ability to act on the publicly disclosed information, as applied by a majority of circuits, or whether overlap with public disclosures bars the action, as applied by other circuits?

In 2010, Congress amended the False Claims Act’s public -disclosure provision to expand—rather than limit—the class of whistleblowers who may proceed when elements of a fraud have entered the public domain. By redefining “original source” to include those “who [have] knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions,” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B), Congress ensured that meritorious actions would not be foreclosed merely because prior disclosures permitted an inference of fraud. Preserving actions based on independ-ent, non-public information that materially enhances the government’s understanding of a fraud ensures that the False Claims Act continues to serve its fun-damental purpose—protecting the public fisc by uncovering and deterring fraud against the United States. The question presented is: Whether the requirement in 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(B) that a relator have “knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly dis-closed allegations or transa ctions” requires a distinct inquiry into whether the relator’s non-public information meaningfully contributes to the government’s understanding or ability to act on the publicly disclosed information, as applied by a majority of circuits, or whether overlap wi th public disclosures bars the action, as applied by other circuits?