Whether a district court violates pleading standards by sua sponte inferring probable cause against a pro se plaintiff at the motion to dismiss stage

In §1983 claims for unconstitutional false arrest (a Fourth Amendment violation), the existence of proba ble cause is often treated as an absolute defense for officers. While this Court in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001), reaffirmed that an ar rest supported by probable cause is constitutional, lower courts are divided on whether such probable cause can be “dispelled ” once new, plainly exculpatory information emerges. The courts of appeals disagree on whether officers must consider exculpatory facts or affirmative defenses that undermine initial probable cause, raising a recurring question about the limits of Fourth Amendment reasonableness and §1983 ac countability. Petitioner Abiel Brathwaite filed a pro se §1983 ac tion alleging false arrest, unlawful search of person, and retaliation in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments. The district court dismissed the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, reciting facts contrary to the plead ings —including adopting disputed hearsay and sua sponte inferring probable cause —without allowing leave to amend. The Fourth Circuit summarily af firmed in a one-paragraph, two-page unpublished per curiam opinion and subsequently denied panel re hearing and rehearing en banc under Fed. R. App. P. 35 and 40. This petition presents the following questions: Whether a district court violates the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard and this Court ’s precedents in 11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly by sua sponte inferring a theory of probable cause not raised by the defendants and resolving disputed fac tual inferences against a pro se plaintiff at the motion to dismiss stage. Whether there is an entrenched conflict among the courts of appeals regarding the ‘mandatory ’ versus ‘discretionary ’ duty of a district court to sua sponte grant a pro se litigant at least one opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissing with prejudice, consistent with the liberal amendment policy of Foman v. Davis. Whether the Fourth Amendment is violated when law enforcement officers disregard plainly exculpa tory evidence that emerges after an initial seizure, and whether such evidence can dissipate probable cause to render a continued arrest or prosecution un constitutional.