Whether the Third Circuit Court of Appeals correctly held that a plaintiff asserting a claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) must establish that the employer had actual knowledge of the pregnancy as a required element of the prima facie case

Dr. Sorokina appeals to this Court the order of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit solely with respect to her pregnancy discrimination claims brought under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (“PDA ”). The central principle of the PDA is that “women affected by pregnancy and related conditions must be treated the same as other applicants and employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work. ” Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 364 (3d Cir.), order clarified, 543 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2008). The statute affords protection not only to women who are pregnant at the time an adverse employment action is taken, but also to those who have terminated a pregnancy or are considering doing so. Under the specific circumstances presented here, Appellant contends that the requirement that an employer have “actual knowledge ” of a pregnancy warrants reconsideration and reversal. Question 1: Whether the Third Circuit Court of Appeals correctly held that a plaintiff asserting a claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 42 U.S.C. §2000e, must establish that the employer had actual knowledge of the pregnancy as a required element of the prim a facie case. Suggested answer: No. Question 2-’ Whether the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ’ requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate the employer ’s actual knowledge of her pregnancy as part of the prima facie case under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act conflicts with the “shared intent ” or “Cat’s Paw ” theory of liability recognized in Staub v. Proctor Hospital. Suggested answer: Yes.