Morgan Banks, et al. v. David H. Hoffman, et al.
JusticiabilityDoctri Jurisdiction
May the D.C. Council impose the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act's special-motion-to-dismiss procedures in Superior Court notwithstanding Congressional mandates regarding federal rules of civil procedure?
The Constitution vests Congress with exclusive legis lative authority over the seat of the Nation’s government. Exercising that authority, when Congress established the modern courts of the District of Columbia through the 1970 District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act, it required the Superior Court to conduct its business under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it vested exclusive authority to modify those Rules in the District’s judiciary. In 1973, the District of Columbia Home Rule Act reaffirmed that mandate, requiring Distric t courts to “continue as provided under” the 1970 Act and prohibiting the D.C. Council from legislating “ with respect to any provision of Title 11” of the D.C. Code, which codifies the federal mandate. The en banc decision below violates th ose Congres sional commands. In upholding a Council -enacted anti-SLAPP regime that conflicts with the Federal Rules in multiple ways, t he decision recast the plain language of the controlling federal statutes, including by narrowing Congress’s categorical prohibition against Council legislation “ with respect to ” Title 11. It creates a direct conflict with the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the D.C. Anti -SLAPP Act cannot operate in a Federal -Rules court, thereby replicating within the District the national split among circuits about whether anti -SLAPP procedures can live alongside the Federal Rules. The questions presented are: 1. May the D.C. Council impose the D.C. Anti SLAPP Act’s special -motionto-dismiss procedures in Superior Court notwithstanding Congress’s command (codified in D.C. Code § 11 -946) that the court conduct ii its business under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Home Rule Act’s bar on Council legislation “ with respect to any provision of Title 11, ” D.C. Code § 1 -206.02(a)(4)? 2. May anti -SLAPP special -motion procedures that stay discovery and require an early merits showing before discovery —thereby displacing Rules 12 and 56, including Rule 56(d) —operate in courts required to conduct their business under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?