Whether retroactive application of a judicial decision changing legal precedent violates the Due Process Clause when it deprives a party of vested rights

This case presents a classic vehicle for this Court to clarify that a judicial decision which changes legal precedent cannot be applied retroactively to divest a private party of vested rights. A judicial decision that changes legal precedent should only be applied retroactively where private rights have not vested. This critical question cannot be presented more clearly than in this case. Here the Court can compare sideby-side two cases involving the same facts, same law, same injunction, same judicial panel, but different results solely because the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals retroactively applied this Court’s recent decision in Lackey v. Stinnie ,145 S. Ct. 659 (2025), and its new construction of 42 U.S.C. §1988, to deprive Petitioners of their vested rights. The Question s Presented are as follow s: 1. Whether retroactive application of Lackey v. Stinnie , 145 S. Ct. 659 (2025) and its new construction of 42 U.S.C. §1988, t hat results in the depravation of a vested, substantive, and unreviewable judgment to attorney’s fees violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2. Whether a judicial decision that changes legal precedent violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it is applied retroactively to deprive a party of a vested right.