Does a federal district court lack jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where a state-court loser of a challenge of a tax sale of the loser's home brings a federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the state statues and rules governing the tax sale?

On October 3, 2025 this Court granted the petition for certiorari in Pung v. Isabella Cty., Mich. Case No. 25-95 (“Pung ”) where a homeowner mounted a federal court constitutional challenge to the tax sale of his home for less than its fair market value. Mr. Pung had previously lost a state court challenge to the sale, and thus was a state court loser challenging a state court judgment on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. Eight weeks before, in this case, the Ninth Circuit refused to allow Petitioner Peyman Roshan to intervene in order to challenge a published decision holding that an Arizona homeowner making a similar constitutional challenge in a virtually identical procedural position in the Arizona federal district court after losing in state court was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Searle v. Allen, 148 F.4th 1121 (9th Cir. 2025) (“Searle ”). Under the Ninth Circuit ’s interpretation of Rooker-Feldman in Searle, this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide Pung. The questions presented are: 1. Does a federal district court lack jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where a state-court loser of a challenge of a tax sale of the loser ’s home brings a federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the state statues and rules governing the tax sale? 2. Does the Ninth Circuit ’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and dismissal of the as-applied challenge of Searle in this 3. 4.ii case conflict with this Court ’s most recent Rooker-Feldman, application in Reed v. Goertz, 143 S.Ct. 955 (2023) holding that a federal district court has jurisdiction to hear federal claims from a state court loser asserting the unconstitutionality of the state ’s statutes and rules as authoritatively interpreted in the state court, as such claims are “general challenges ” or “general attacks ” allowed under District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462 (1983)? Is the Ninth Circuit ’s holding that the facial challenge against Arizona ’s tax sale statute is moot erroneous under this Court ’s decision in Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 482 (1990)? Given this Court ’s recent emphasis on the party presentation principle, do both due process and sound appellate administration require that litigants, whose past or ongoing case would be controlled by a precedential Court of Appeals decision in a separate case in which the litigants are not parties, be allowed as a mattei' of right to raise new arguments or approaches that the parties to the precedential decision overlooked or declined to raise?