Whether the Second Amendment permits a categorical prohibition on firearm possession for nonviolent felons who have completed their sentences, without an individualized assessment of dangerousness

No question identified. : firearm. That prohibition applies even to non-violent offenders such as the Applicant here, Steven Duarte, who served his sentence and reentered society years ago. Following this Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), Duarte argued that §922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to himself and other nonviolent felons like him. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected Duarte’s claim, holding that §922(g)(1) remains constitutional as applied to all felons even after Bruen. That decision conflicts with the reasoning of other courts of appeals and raises a fundamental question about whether the government may impose permanent Second Amendment disabilities based solely on a person’s criminal record, untethered from any individualized showing of dangerousness. 3. The facts relevant to this case are as follows. On March 20, 2020, Duarte was a passenger in a car stopped by law enforcement for driving through a stop sign. As the officers activated their car’s lights and sirens, Duarte was observed throwing a pistol, without its magazine, out of the car’s rear window. After asking the driver and Duarte to step out of the vehicle, officers searched the car and found a magazine loaded with six .380-caliber bullets stuffed between the center console and the front passenger seat. The magazine fit into the discarded pistol. 4. Duarte was arrested, and he was later indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by any person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. (Duarte previously had been convicted of, and served his sentences for, drug-related and property offenses.) Duarte was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment. 5. At the time of his trial, Ninth Circuit precedent foreclosed Second Amendment challenges to §922(g)(1), including as-applied challenges, so Duarte did not raise the issue. While his case was on appeal, however, this Court decided Bruen, clarifying the framework for Second Amendment claims. Duarte accordingly raised a Second Amendment challenge to his conviction for the first time on appeal, arguing that §922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him under Bruen. 6. A three-judge panel agreed with him. United States v. Duarte, 101 F.4th 657 (9th Cir. 2024). The panel first held that Duarte had demonstrated good cause for not raising the argument to the district court, because circuit precedent in United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1 (9th Cir. 2010), foreclosed his argument at that time; the panel thus applied de novo review, rather than plain error review. Duarte, 101 F.4th at 663. The panel majority then concluded that Vongxay was irreconcilable with Bruen, and accordingly proceeded to evaluate Duarte’s claim anew. Id. at 66465. Applying Bruen’s framework, the panel majority held (1) that the conduct §922(g)(1) restricted as applied to Duarte (possessing a firearm after serving time for nonviolent offenses) is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment and (2) that the government failed to meet its burden of showing that the application of §922(g)(1) was consistent with historical tradition. Id. at 665-91. 7. The Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc, “vacat[ing]” the “three-judge panel decision.” United States v. Duarte, 108 F.4th 786, 786 (9th Cir. 2024). The en banc panel then affirmed Duarte’s conviction. United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc). 8. The en banc court held that §922(g)(1) is “not unconstitutional as applied to non-violent felons like Duarte,” concluding that historical tradition permits a legislature to disarm those who have committed the most serious crimes, without an individualized determination of dangerousness. Id. at 749. To support its view of the permissibility of permanent disarmament, the majority cited Founding-era punishments such as death and estate forfeiture for fe