Whether the Lanham Act's trademark opposition provision requires a plaintiff to demonstrate proximate causation and zone of interests standing under the Lexmark framework for administrative proceedings

No question identified. : the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) allows an applicant to register a trademark, the USPTO will publish the mark in its Official Gazette. Id. § 1062(a). Section 1063 provides that “[a]ny person who believes that he would be damaged by the registration of a mark upon the principal register ... may, upon payment of the prescribed fee, file an opposition in the Patent and Trademark Office, stating the grounds therefor, within thirty days after the publication under subsection (a) of section 1062 of this title of the mark sought to be registered.” Id. § 1063. 2. Respondent United Trademark Holdings (UTH) sought to register the mark RAPUNZEL on dolls and toy figures, and the examining attorney ultimately determined to allow the mark. In accordance with § 1063, Applicant Rebecca Curtin filed an opposition within 30 days of the publication of the mark. Curtin contended that UTH’s proposed mark fails to function as a trademark, explaining that UTH seeks to register a mark that consists of a name with a pre-established value and meaning to consumers, who will recognize “Rapunzel” as the name of a fairy-tale character known in various forms for hundreds of years. As such, the proposed mark merely informs consumers and is a generic descriptor or highly descriptive of UTH’s goods. Curtin further demonstrated that she falls within the “broad class of persons who are proper opposers” because she has “a belief that [she] would suffer some kind of damage if the mark is registered.” Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1999). She also showed that she meets the two additional requirements that the Federal Circuit had previously reiterated as conditions for statutory standing in an opposition proceeding: she has “a ‘real interest’ in the proceedings” and has “a ‘reasonable’ basis for [her] belief of damage.” Id. 3. The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (Board) dismissed Curtin’s opposition, concluding that she lacked the ability to oppose the registration of a mark under § 1063. The Board rejected the long-standing standard for who may oppose registration of a mark, which has been reiterated in cases such as Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092. It did so by concluding that the Federal Circuit has held that the proper standard is the one articulated by this Court in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), for causes of action—that is, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she falls within the zone of interests protected by the statute and that damage would be proximately caused by registration of the mark. The Board determined that as a consumer, Curtin did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the Lanham Act and did not establish proximate causation. 4. Curtin appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed. The Federal Circuit concluded that an administrative § 1063 opposition proceeding is a “cause of action” to which the Lexmark framework applies. It further concluded that as a consumer, Curtin did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the Lanham Act provisions at issue in this case and had not established proximate causation. 5. The petition for a writ of certiorari will demonstrate that the Federal Circuit erred in establishing the standard for those who may oppose the registration of a mark. In particular, the petition is anticipated to show that the Federal Circuit erred in concluding that an administrative § 1063 opposition proceeding is a “cause of action” to which the Court’s Lexmark framework applies. 6. Good cause exists for an extension of time to prepare a petition for a writ of certiorari in this case. Undersigned counsel has, and has had, several other matters with proximate due dates, including briefing and hearings on sanctions and motions to compel in dbrand Inc. v. Casetify Ltd., Case No. 24-cv-1919 (N.D. IIL), ongoing discovery obligations and deadlines in other district court litigation, and the preparation