Whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA) deferential standard of review for state court decisions violates the constitutional requirements of an independent federal judiciary

No question identified. : The standards for granting a stay of execution are well established. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983). There “must be a reasonable probability that four members of the Court would consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a significant possibility of reversal of the lower court’s decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable harm will result if that decision is not stayed.” Jd. (internal citations omitted). Regarding the question of whether the underlying issue is sufficiently meritorious, Mr. Bates’ application for certiorari raises a concern regarding the circuit courts’ habit of imposing an overly burdensome standard of review for determining COA, precluding review of Mr. Bates’ constitutional claims. Mr. Bates’ case is not an isolated error. Rather, it is part of a larger, repeated pattern emerging from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. See, e.g., Tharpe v. Sellers, 583 U.S. 33, 34 (2018) (remanding for COA where “[t]he Eleventh Circuit’s decision, as we read it, was based solely on its conclusion”); Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017) (remanding where the Fifth Circuit denied COA based on a conclusion that the petitioner would not prevail on a Rule 60(b) motion). In this case, regardless of any conclusion that one may draw about the underlying merits of Mr. Bates’ case, the issue is without doubt “debatable.” MillerEl v. Cockrell, 5837 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). Members of the Eleventh Circuit had previously expressed concern about the application of AEDPA deference in Mr. Bates’ case. Bates v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 768 F.3d 1278, 1307-20 (11th Cir. 2014) (Wilson, J., concurring) (“we figuratively throw up our hands, repeat the refrain that AEPDA requires deference to state courts, and deny habeas relief” . . . “unless or until the Supreme Court tells us otherwise.”) Prior to reviewing Mr. Bates’ case, the Eleventh Circuit had granted COA to address the question of AEDPA deference in Washington v. Marshall, Case No. 24-13905 (11th Cir). And the Sixth and Ninth Circuits had begun questioning the constitutionality of AEDPA deference in response to this Court’s opinion in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 410 (2024), which overruled Chevron deference. E.g., Sanders v. Plappert, Case No. 166152 (6th Cir.) (describing 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) as “ambiguous” as the statute being discussed in Loper Bright and thus highlighting that the constitutionality of AEDPA is “debatable” during oral arguments); Smith v. Thornell, Case No. 25-1964 (9th Cir. ECF 7) (arguing “[t]he same constitutional principles animating Loper Bright require courts to eschew applying Williams deference, which has a similarly impermissible function as Chevron deference . . . It is debatable whether Loper Bright unsettles the framework of state-court deference established by the Supreme Court in Williams calling for it not to be reexamined. And it is debatable whether Williams deference is unconstitutional because it conflicts with the constitutional requirement of an independent federal judiciary.”) The cases that Mr. Bates cited in his Rule 60(b) motion to reopen his case and again in his application for a COA are pending and have been granted extensive briefing to address the complexity surrounding AEDPA deference. See, e.g., Washington v. Marshall, Case No. 24-13905 (11th Cir.) (granting the State a 30-day extension in which to file a brief (Doc. 38)); Sanders v. Plappert, Case No. 16-6152 (6th Cir.) (permitting additional written litigation after the oral argument (Docs. 196, 197, 198 & 199)); Mothershead v. Wofford, Case No. 24-5706 (9th Cir.) (setting oral argument for Sept. 16, 2025 (Doc. 37)); United States v. Lucidonio, Case No. 24-1285 (3d Cir.) (granting petitioner’s request to file a supplemental