Whether the Due Process Clause prohibits a district court from compelling a party to testify through preselected deposition excerpts while barring that party from presenting their own testimony in defense, and from imposing irreversible sanctions that effectively moot appellate review

No question identified. : Breaking from ordinary practice, the Second Circuit panel provided no explanation for denying the stay. On August 12, 2025, a single judge of that court granted a temporary stay to preserve the status quo, recognizing the risk of mootness. 24 hours later, a three-judge panel vacated that order, without explanation, despite no change in the factual or procedural landscape. This unexplained shift in outcome, in the face of imminent, irreversible harm, raises concerns about the integrity of appellate review and underscores the need for this Court’s intervention. The equities favor maintaining the status quo. Plaintiff abandoned this domain in July 2024, switching to “CleerTax.com” months before any alleged conduct at issue, and has operated under that name for more than a year. There is no justification for this extinguishment of appellate jurisdiction except prevention of meaningful review of rights on appeal. The order at issue is marked by by due process defects: (1) Applicant was compelled to testify for the opposing party through preselected deposition excerpts while barred from testifying in her own defense; (2) the court ordered permanent domain transfer in contrast to the recommendation from the magistrate judge, adding this extraordinary remedy sua sponte and without the statutory objection period; (3) the court improperly shifted the burden of proof to Applicant to prove ownership when property was in her name; and (4) the court leveraged a contempt sanction to compel immediate compliance mid-appeal, intentionally mooting appellate review and this Court’s jurisdiction. The stakes extend beyond this case: if trial courts may compel irreversible acts that moot appeals, especially under these procedural defects, appellate review becomes an empty formality. The public has a strong interest in reaffirming that judicial power remains bound by constitutional process, even, and especially, when expedience tempts otherwise. 2. PROCED L HISTOR ° January 30, 2025 — The district court conducted the preliminary injunction hearing. Applicant was compelled to testify for the opposing party through preselected excerpts of her deposition but not permitted to present her own testimony in defense. This occurred despite material factual disputes remaining unresolved. ° June 17, 2025: The District Court (D. Conn., Judge Michael P. Shea) entered a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 210) compelling Applicant to immediately transfer the domain “Cleer.tax” to Plaintiff Cleer LLC, among other restrictions. ° — June 19, 2025: Applicant filed Notice of Appeal in District Court (ECF No. 210). ° June 27, 2025: Applicant moved in the Second Circuit for a partial stay of the injunction (No. 25-1575, Doe. 8). ° Aug. 4, 2025: The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for contempt (ECF No. 243) for nontransfer of the domain, imposing sanctions and a compliance deadline of August 12, 2025, effectively forcing transfer before appellate review could occur. ° Aug. 12, 2025: Circuit Judge Maria Aratijo Kahn granted a temporary stay pending review by a three-judge panel, recognizing the need to preserve the status quo (Doc. 36). ° Aug. 13, 2025: Three-judge panel (Judges Sullivan, Park, Menashi) reversed the stay without explanation, denying the motion as to the domain transfer but granting expedited decision on the stay (Doc. 38). The panel provided no findings or reasoning, leaving Applicant with the same imminent choice: transfer now and lose the appeal, or face additional contempt sanctions. 3. JURISDICTION This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (All Writs Act) and 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) (stay pending review). As Circuit Justice for the Second Circuit, Justice Sotomayor has authority to act on this application. Applicant first sought the same relief in the district court; that motion remains pending. Given the imminent deadline and risk of mootness, immediate intervention is necessary. 4 NS FOR GRANTIN' The Nken v. Holder, 5