Whether a state court expungement that does not completely negate a prior misdemeanor domestic violence conviction qualifies as an 'expungement' under 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(B)(ii) for purposes of restoring federal firearm possession rights

No question identified. : To the Honorable Amy Coney Barrett, as Circuit Justice for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: In accordance with this Court’s Rules 13.5, 22, 30.2, and 30.3, Applicant Scot Van Oudenhoven respectfully requests that the time to file his petition for a writ of certiorari be extended for 60 days, up to and including Friday, November 21, 2025. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin issued its decision on June 24, 2025 (Exhibit A). Absent an extension of time, the petition would be due on September 22, 2025. The jurisdiction of this Court is based on 28 U.S.C. 1257(a). This request is unopposed. Background This case presents an important question on the application of 18 U.S.C. § 922((33)(B)(ii)). That section provides for an exemption from the general prohibition against possessing firearms by people with a record of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)) that has been expunged by the state in which the crime occurred. The question is whether an expungement must, under state law, completely negate a conviction in order to count as an expungement under federal law. There is disagreement on this matter among the lower courts. Two circuits and another state supreme court have held that a state expungement must remove all effects of a conviction to count as an expungement under federal law. One circuit has held in dicta that, in the parallel language of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), Congress intended for expunged convictions to be disregarded. Another circuit ruled that a “restoration of rights” provides an exemption for domestic violence misdemeanants 1 from 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), even if the conviction is not completely undone. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled in the present case that an expungement must completely negate a conviction in order to count as an expungement under § 921(a)(33)(B)Gi), and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed by dismissing the case on the grounds that review was improvidently granted. This Court has indicated that expungements mean different things in every state and that by relying on state-law procedures, Congress insured anomalous results. On May 28, 2022, applicant Scot Van Oudenhoven attempted to purchase a handgun in Wisconsin. The purchase was denied by the Wisconsin Department of Justice’s “Crime Information Bureau Firearms Unit” on the grounds that Van Oudenhoven had been convicted in 1994 in Wisconsin of battery of the mother of his child. That crime normally would qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (““MCDV”) as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(A), thereby making Van Oudenhoven disqualified from possessing firearms by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)!. But in 2019, the same court that convicted Van Oudenhoven entered an order of expungement in Van Oudenhoven’s case. 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(B)(ii) provides that a person shall not be considered convicted of a MCDV “if the conviction has been expunged.” Van Oudenhoven followed the state procedures for administrative appeals. Of firearm purchase denials and the original decision was affirmed. Van Oudenhoven then commenced an action pursuant to Wisconsin’s procedures for appealing a 1 Wisconsin does not have a statute analogous to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), so the federal statute is Van Oudenhoven’s only impediment to possessing firearms. 2 firearm denial. In the action, he alleged that he had not been “convicted” (by virtue of the expungement) so he was not disqualified under federal law from possessing firearms. He lost at the trial-level and appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that, under federal law, an expungement must completely undo a conviction in order not to count as a conviction for a MCDV. Van Oudenhoven petitioned the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for review. The Court granted review, and the parties briefed and orally argued the case. Van Oudenhoven argued that federal law does not require that an expungement must completely undo the effec