No. 25A335

In Re Blaine Milam

Lower Court: N/A
Docketed: N/A
Status: Denied
Type: A
Experienced Counsel
Tags: actual-innocence death-penalty eighth-amendment forensic-evidence intellectual-disability junk-science
Key Terms:
HabeasCorpus
Latest Conference: N/A
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a potentially innocent defendant based on now-discredited forensic evidence and testimony

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

No question identified. : (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). Whether the applicant unnecessarily delayed in bringing his claims is also considered. Hill, 547 US. at 584. Il. Milam’s petition is likely to succeed on the merits. Milam has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his actual innocence claim for the reasons set out in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In short, no forensic evidence ties Milam to any injury on A.C., the daughter of his then-fiancée Jesseca Carson. At trial, the State relied on (1) bitemark opinion testimony that Milam’s dentition matched certain injuries on A.C., (2) testimony by a State-retained lab that Milam’s DNA was present on those injuries, and (3) testimony by a supposed blood-pattern analysis (BPA) expert. But all of this evidence is now known to be unreliable, false, and prejudicial. First, there is now a consensus that all bitemark opinion testimony is junk science and such testimony is inadmissible in Texas courts. Second, in August 2025, the State-retained lab retracted its DNA testimony from trial, resulting in significant changes to the prior DNA testimony. Moreover, the lab now rejects any inferencedrawing from DNA evidence about how or when an individual’s DNA is transferred to a surface. Third, the testimony about blood stains on a pair of jeans found at the scene days after the offense came from an expert who did not belong to an accredited lab and who did not adhere to methodology to allow him to offer any reliable opinion about how the stains were left on the jeans. The State relied on demonstrably unreliable and prejudicial forensic evidence because it could find no motive for Milam to have killed A.C. By contrast, there is abundant evidence that 2 Carson was suffering from a rare brain disorder, (“PMO”), which causes sufferers to see people’s faces as distorted and warped. Sufferers often describe the distorted faces as malevolent and threatening—and which Milam’s jury never learned about. In her statements to law enforcement, Carson consistently reported seeing such distortions in her daughter’s face, leading her to believe that A.C. was possessed by a demon—a belief Milam never endorsed. She described seeing the demon in A.C.’s face and being frightened of her daughter. Carson told law enforcement that she would rather see A.C. “go to heaven now than to. . . have Satan have her soul and her go to hell when she gets older[.]” Finally, the State introduced testimony from a county jail nurse that Milam had told her he had done “‘it.” It is undisputed, however, that at the time Milam made this vague statement, he had full-scale IQ scores of 71 and 68 on testing administered by the defense and State respectively. And in January 2021, the State’s trial expert revised his prior opinion and concluded that Milam does meet the current diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability. As this Court knows, individuals with low intellectual functioning are especially vulnerable to making false confessions. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002); Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 709 (2014). Il. Milam will be irreparably injured absent a stay. Milam’s impending execution is plainly an irreparable injury. In a capital case, this factor “weighs heavily in the movant’s favor” based on the “irreversible nature of the death penalty.” O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 708 (Sth Cir. 1982). This is particularly true when the underlying claim is that Milam is actually innocent of the offense for which he is scheduled to be executed. IV. Harm to other parties or the public is minimized. Milam recognizes th

Docket Entries

2025-09-25
Application (25A335) referred to the Court.
2025-09-25
Application (25A335) for stay of execution of sentence of death presented to Justice Alito and by him referred to the Court is denied. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
2025-09-23
Application (25A335) for a stay of execution of sentence of death, submitted to Justice Alito.

Attorneys

Blaine Milam
Jeremy Don SchepersOffice of the Federal Public Defender NDTX, Petitioner