Whether the federal catchall statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1658 provides a more suitable limitations period for Section 1983 civil rights claims than state-specific statutes of limitations

No question identified. : 1. Applicants have good cause for a 60-day extension. S. Ct. R. 13.5. This case presents a substantial and important question of federal law regarding the appropriate statute of limitations for federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Section 1983 does not expressly provide a statute of limitations, courts have applied the forum state’s general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury claims to Section 1983 claims. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). The result of this regime is that civil rights plaintiffs are subject to a 50-state patchwork system with varying statutes of limitations that apply to their federal Section 1983 claims. Kentucky is one of only three jurisdictions in the nation with a single-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140(1)(a). In May 2020, Applicants Jennie and Saul Wright had their home ransacked by six officers of the Louisville Metro Police Department who entered the Wrights’ home, held them at gunpoint, and took them into custody—all based on a deficient search warrant. Because the Wrights were initially unable to find out the names of the individual officers involved, they filed their original Complaint against the Louisville Metro Police Department and certain John Doe defendants. With the benefit of postcomplaint discovery, the Wrights uncovered the officers’ identities and attempted to amend their complaint. The courts below, however, held that their amended complaint did not “relate back” to their initial complaint, and that their claims against the named officers were thus time barred under Kentucky’s one-year limitations period. 2. This case presents the Court with an opportunity to revisit the 50-state patchwork regime for Section 1983 claims in light of Congress’ enactment in 1990 of a federal catchall limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 1658. To supply a statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 directs courts to employ a threestep method that first considers whether a “suitable” federal rule exists before borrowing from state law. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47 (1984). Before Congress enacted Section 1658, the answer to that question was no, and federal courts were thus forced to borrow individual states’ statutes of limitations. See Owens, 488 U.S. at 240. But the law has since changed to provide a more suitable federal alternative, and granting review in this case would allow the Court to consider the text of Section 1988 and the appropriate limitations period for federal civil rights claims in light of this development. 3. This case also allows the Court to consider the question it expressly reserved in Owens of whether “applying a 1-year limitations period to § 1983 actions would be inconsistent with federal interests.” 488 U.S. at 251 n.13. While Owens held that a state’s residual statute of limitations should generally apply, it also acknowledged that a state’s limitations period could be too short and therefore inconsistent with federal interests. Id. Here, Kentucky’s one-year limitations period is inconsistent with federal interests because it fails to account for the practicalities of filing a Section 1983 claim and therefore thwarts the ability of victims to vindicate their important federal civil rights. See Burnett, 468 U.S. at 50. This case thus presents an ideal vehicle for the Court to address the question it explicitly reserved in Owens. 4. In the decision below, the Sixth Circuit held that Applicants’ claims are time-barred under Kentucky’s one-year limitations period. The court acknowledged that Section 1658 was enacted “after the Supreme Court decided Burnett,” but it determined that “absent a change in law or Supreme Court precedent,” it was bound “{a]s an inferior court” and could not consider whether Section 1658 is “suitable” for Section 1983 claims. Wright, 144 F.4th at 826. 5. The Sixth Circuit also strongly suggested that Applicants’ great nephews, wh