Whether a federal court may exercise Article III jurisdiction over a state law privacy claim where the plaintiff alleges a statutory violation but cannot demonstrate a concrete, traditionally recognized harm

No question identified. : To the Honorable Elena Kagan, as Circuit Justice for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 13.5, Applicant Glen Morgan respectfully requests a 60-day extension of time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari, to and including December 5, 2025. In support of this request, Applicant states as follows: 1. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion on April 30, 2025. See Ex. A. Applicant timely filed a petition for rehearing on May 13, 2025, which the court denied on July 9, 2025. See Ex. B, C. Absent an extension of time, the petition for certiorari would be due on October 7, 2025. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1254. 2. This case involves the important issue of the limited authority of federal courts to entertain class action suits in which the prospective lead plaintiff suffered no Art. III cognizable harm, and disclaims any Article III cognizable harm on his own behalf and that of the prospective class. 3. In TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), this Court held that a federal court only has Art. III authority to hear a case where the plaintiff suffered a concrete harm, regardless of whether Congress had created a private right of action and the ability to recover a statutory damages award. “No concrete harm, no standing.” Id. at 417. 4. To avail oneself of the federal courts, the Court held, the party invoking federal jurisdiction had to show that “the asserted harm has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts .. Id. 5. Applicant Glen Morgan, a Washington subscriber to the Defendant’s social media app, sued in state court on his own behalf and on behalf of a putative class of fellow Washingtonians, alleging that X, Corp. had violated RCW 9.26A.140. That law forbids any person from procuring the telephone record of another through false or deceptive means. The statute creates a private right of action, with statutory damages. Mr. Morgan specifically alleged that the statue’s definition of “telephone record” encompassed his cell phone number, a record that is not listed in telephone directories but which he routinely shares with others. 6. Mr. Morgan alleged that X, Corp. induced subscribers to disclose cell phone numbers to it, in violation of RCW 9.26A.140, by making routine false statements about its privacy practices and the steps it would take to protect the numbers from further dissemination or use contrary to X, Corp.’s promises to subscribers. Mr. Morgan identified two separate FTC enforcement actions showing X, Corp.’s false statements (including false statements about its compliance with its consent decrees with the FTC) as well as extensive whistleblower testimony to the United States Senate detailing the extent to which X, Corp. made knowingly false statements about its protection of sensitive user data. 7. X, Corp. removed the lawsuit from Spokane County Superior Court to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, more than 30 days after service, then moved to dismiss. 8. Mr. Morgan sought remand on the grounds that X, Corp. had failed to carry its burden to demonstrate either statutory or Art. III jurisdiction. 9. The trial court denied all motions to remand and granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Mr. Morgan appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing (among other things) that no federal court could exercise Art. III jurisdiction over the case, because procuring a non-private piece of information (a cell phone number) does not have “a ‘close relationship’ to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts ...” While X, Corp. argued—and the district court and Ninth Circuit agreed—that its alleged violation was akin to common law invasion of privacy, Mr. Morgan countered that common law privacy rights only extend to information a person act