No. 25A356

Victor Tony Jones v. Florida, et al.

Lower Court: Florida
Docketed: N/A
Status: Denied
Type: A
Experienced Counsel
Tags: atkins-v-virginia death-penalty due-process eighth-amendment intellectual-disability supreme-court-precedent
Key Terms:
DueProcess Punishment
Latest Conference: N/A
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of an intellectually disabled defendant when a state court disregards clearly established Supreme Court precedent on intellectual disability standards

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

No question identified. : STANDARDS FOR A STAY OF EXECUTION The standards for granting a stay of execution are well established. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983). There “must be a reasonable probability that four members of the Court would consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a significant possibility of reversal of the lower court’s decision; and there must be a 9 likelihood that irreparable harm will result if that decision is not stayed.” Jd. (quoting White v. Florida, 458 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1982) (Powell, J., in chambers). PETITIONER SHOULD BE GRANTED A STAY OF EXECUTION The questions raised in Mr. Jones’s petition are sufficiently meritorious for a grant of certiorari, present significant questions of constitutional law, and are not subject to any legitimate procedural impediments. As demonstrated in his underlying petition, Jones’s death sentence is unreliable and violative of this Court’s Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Jones argues that his impending execution is violative of the Eighth Amendment because he is intellectually disabled and the Florida courts have routinely disregarded this Court’s opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and its progeny in order to deny his claim. This Court’s opinions in Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), Moore v. Texas (Moore I), 581 U.S. 1 (2017), and Moore v. Texas (Moore II), 586 U.S. 133 (2019), establish that the Florida court’s rulings on Jones’s intellectual disability claim is fundamentally wrong. The Florida Supreme Court continues to disregard this Court’s precedent, and universally accepted clinical standards, in its assessment of intellectual disability. Jones further argues that he was denied due process and his right to be heard on a question of federal constitutional law, when Florida denied him a full and fair postconviction proceeding under warrant. In so doing, the Florida Supreme Court disregarded this Court’s precedent concerning the presentation and consideration of mitigation evidence in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 43 (2009); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 525 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) The Florida Supreme Court’s habitual diminution of fundamental Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment protections flouts clearly established federal law. Jones’s claims in his petition are not subject to any legitimate procedural impediments. This Court’s precedent is clear that if “the State has made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law,” then it does not rest on “independent” grounds. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). In denying Mr. Jones’s habeas petition, concerning his intellectual disability claim, the court misstated Jones’s argument. In so doing, the court determined the argument was procedurally barred as it was merely a request for the court to reconsider its decision affirming the lower court’s denial of Jones’s ID claim pursuant to Hall v. Florida. Jones v. State, Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., SC2025-1423, 2025 WL 2717027, *20 (Fla. Sept. 24, 2025). This was not Jones’s argument. Jones sought habeas review in light of this Court’s decision in decisional law that was issued after the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in 2017. Notwithstanding, the Florida court’s analysis is both contrary to Florida law and this Court’s precedent. 3 Absent this Court’s intervention, the irreparable harm to Jones is clear. Wainwright v. Booker, 473 U.S. 935, 937 n.1 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (finding the requirement of irreparable harm as “necessarily present in capital cases”). Given the final nature of the death penalty there should be no point at which these considerations are foreclosed. “[E]xecution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; .. . death is different.

Docket Entries

2025-09-30
Reply of applicant Victor Jones filed.
2025-09-30
Application (25A356) referred to the Court.
2025-09-30
Application (25A356) for stay of execution of sentence of death presented to Justice Thomas and by him referred to the Court is denied. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
2025-09-29
Response to application from respondent Florida filed.
2025-09-27
Application (25A356) for a stay of execution of sentence of death, submitted to Justice Thomas.

Attorneys

State of Florida
Carla Suzanne BechardOffice of the Attorney General, State of Florida, Respondent
Carla Suzanne BechardOffice of the Attorney General, State of Florida, Respondent
Victor Jones
Marie-Louise Samuels ParmerCapital Collateral Regional Counsel - South Office, Petitioner
Marie-Louise Samuels ParmerCapital Collateral Regional Counsel - South Office, Petitioner