In Re Gregory Alvin James Van Etten
DueProcess
Whether a federal court may refuse enforcement of state court orders entered without valid service of process and in violation of due process protections
1. Whether enforcement of Title IV-D orders entered without lawful service of process constitutes irreparable harm and requires a stay. 2. Whether a federal court may allow continued enforcement of void judgments where certified records demonstrate defective service. 3. Whether restrictions on filings imposed by a district judge (“curb order”) amount to a prior restraint violating the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. Statement of Jurisdiction Authority to Enter a Stay. This Application is brought under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and Supreme Court Rules 22 and 23. The relief sought is an emergency stay of ongoing enforcement (not merits disposition) to preserve federal court jurisdiction and prevent irreparable harm while the First Circuit considers Petitioner’s mandamus (No. 25-1852) and while the District of Massachusetts addresses the threshold voidjudgment issue. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (stay factors); Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426-27 (2009). Background and Procedural History ° In Van Etten v. Fattman et al., No. 4:24-cv-40113-MRG (D. Mass.), Petitioner challenged ongoing Title IV-D enforcement actions as void for lack of jurisdiction. ° This case has now been pending for over a year without a ruling on the threshold jurisdictional defect, despite certified records being filed (Dkts. 79, 117, 119, 120).” ° Petitioner filed a Rule 60(b)(4) motion (Dkt. 79) supported by certified docket records showing fraudulent and incomplete service. ° The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal without addressing this jurisdictional defect, and imposed a “curb order” restricting filings. © Petitioner objected (Dkt. 117) and filed a supplement with certified exhibits (Dkt. 119), yet no ruling has issued. ° Meanwhile, enforcement continues: garnishments, IRS lock-in letters, and bank seizures exceeding $106,000.00. ° Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus (No. 25-1852) in the First Circuit. That petition is pending. ARGUMENT Federal Authority to Withhold Effect from Void State Orders. A judgment entered without valid service or personal jurisdiction is “absolutely void” and open to collateral attack in any forum. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33. “Failure to give notice violates the most rudimentary demands of due process,” and such a judgment cannot be enforced. Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84-86. A judgment entered “in a manner inconsistent with due process of law” is void. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271. The federal courts therefore have both the power and duty to refuse effect to void state predicates and to enjoin ongoing enforcement that rests on them. Exhaustion and Impracticability of Relief Below. For years, Petitioner has attempted to obtain review of the same constitutional question—the absence of lawful service and personal jurisdiction in the underlying Worcester Probate and Family Court case. Beginning at the state level, Petitioner filed multiple motions to vacate those orders as void for lack of service, all denied without explanation or factual rebuttal. He then sought federal review, filing his § 1983 complaint in the District of Massachusetts in 2024, where the same jurisdictional question has remained pending for more than a year. During that time, enforcement continued: wages were garnished, the IRS issued a lock-in letter, and Petitioner ultimately lost his employment as a direct result. What began as a procedural defect has now ripened into ongoing and irreparable constitutional injury that only this Court can presently prevent. Petitioner sought emergency relief and expedition in the First Circuit (No. 25-1852). The District of Massachusetts has not ruled on the Rule 60(b)(4) void-judgment motion despite certified records demonstrating lack of service; a filing curb in the Magistrate’s R&R (Dkt. 116) restricts additional filings. Petitioner complied by submitting a single consolidated objection