Whether a child's habitual residence under the Hague Convention can be modified by parental actions demonstrating shared intent to change jurisdiction, despite a prior court determination

No question identified. : e Sept. 25, 2025: District court ordered return of the child to Sweden. e Oct. 9, 2025: Applicant filed Notice of Appeal in the First Circuit. e Oct. 13, 2025: First Circuit denied stay without prejudice, directing application to district court. e Oct. 14, 2025: District court denied stay. e Oct. 14, 2025: First Circuit denied renewed emergency motion. e Child’s Scheduled Departure: Thursday, Oct. 16, 2025, at 4:50 PM.. Ul. LEGAL STANDARD When evaluating a motion to stay the return of a child in a Hague Convention proceeding, The Supreme Court considers: “(1) whether the stay application has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of a stay will substantially injure other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 179 (2013). The First Circuit has a demonstrated history of granting motions to stay pending appeal in Hague Convention proceedings. See, e.g., Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F. 3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2002); Charalambous v. Charalambous, 627 F.3d 462, 465 (1st Cir. 2010). IV. ARGUMENT A. Appellant’s Appeal of the Order is Likely to Succeed on the Merits. Where an appeal is likely to succeed on the merits, the Supreme Court has stated that granting a stay of an order pending the outcome of an appeal is the preferred outcome. The district court concluded Sweden remained the child’s habitual residence by August 2024, but failed to weigh undisputed evidence. On August 18, 2024, Applicant notified Appellee of the child’s acceptance into a Boston school. Appellee thereafter signed official withdrawal papers removing the child from Swedish school so she could attend Boston school through December 2024. The Hague petition was not filed until nearly a year later. Under Monashy v. Taglieri, 589 U.S. 68 (2020), habitual residence turns on both acclimatization and shared parental intent. Appellee’s own actions demonstrate affirmative parental intent to prolong U.S. residence. Instead of recognizing this evidence, the district court supplied a theory that Applicant “tricked” Appellee—an argument he never made—thus improperly substituting judicial speculation for petitioner’s proof. This was legal error, not a credibility call. The Hague Convention and ICARA place the burden on the petitioner. Yet the district court drew inferences to cure Appellee’s deficiencies as a pro se litigant, effectively acting as his advocate. The First Circuit has cautioned against this exact error. See Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2002). Such burdenshifting is a reviewable legal error that makes success on appeal likely. The Child will suffer irreparable harm if she is required to return to Sweden during the pendency of this appeal. The purpose of the Hague Convention is to protect children from the harm and disruption of their wrongful removal to another country. Removal will cause the child immediate and profound harm, including abrupt separation from her mother. Unrebutted expert testimony (Dr. B.J. Cling) established that forced separation from Applicant would cause serious psychological harm. The school counselor and teacher corroborated this risk. Swedish legal memoranda confirmed Applicant would face detention upon return, rendering separation “immediate and inevitable.” The district court discounted this as “hypothetical” harm, in direct conflict with Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 218 (1st Cir. 2000), which recognizes grave risk where professional evidence establishes substantial danger. Together, these errors raise serious, substantial questions of law and fact. Applicant’s appeal is not only colorable—it is strong. B. The Child Will Be Irreparably Harmed in the Absence of a Stay. If removal occurs Thursday, the First Circuit appeal becomes effectively moot. The child faces abrupt, potentially permanent separation from her pri