No. 25A600

Raymon Walters v. United States

Lower Court: Third Circuit
Docketed: 2025-11-20
Status: Application
Type: A
Tags: counsel-concession criminal-defense element-challenge mccoy-right sixth-amendment trial-strategy
Latest Conference: N/A
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether the Sixth Amendment permits defense counsel to concede an element of a charged crime over the defendant's objection

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

in this case. In the decision below, the Third Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee recognized in McCoy encompasses the “right to contest discrete elements of the crime” of conviction. App. 9. In so doing, the Third Circuit expressly “depart[ed] from the Second Circuit,” id. at 11 n.7, which has held that “the right to autonomy is not implicated when defense counsel concedes one element of the charged crime while maintaining that the defendant is not guilty as charged,” United States v. Rosemond, 958 F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2020). The Third Circuit’s decision likewise conflicts with a decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Epperson v. Commonwealth, 645 S.W.3d 405, 408-409 (Ky. 2021). Only this Court can resolve this division of authority over the Sixth Amendment’s application to counsel’s concession of an element of the charged crime over his client’s objection. 4. The question presented warrants the Court’s intervention. Members of the Court have recognized that the question may arise “frequently.” McCoy, 584 U.S. at 435 (Alito, J., dissenting). Indeed, in the wake of McCoy, lower courts have routinely confronted the question. The frequently recurring nature of the question is unsurprising because, in many cases involving common crimes, conceding an element will often be a sound trial strategy. That is particularly so in cases (like this one) involving felon-in-possession offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), where the defendant will often have little basis to challenge the validity of a prior felony conviction and where the “name or nature of the prior offense ... generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185 (1997). 5. The application for a 30-day extension is necessary because Applicant has only recently affiliated undersigned counsel at Cooley LLP. The extension is needed for new counsel to fully familiarize themselves with the record, decision below, and relevant case law, and to allow counsel adequate time to prepare the petition for certiorari. The press of other business and deadlines means these tasks will take several weeks. 6. For these reasons, Applicant requests that the due date for his petition for a writ of certiorari be extended to January 2, 2026. Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ Ephraim A. McDowell EPHRAIM A. MCDOWELL Counsel of Record ALEXANDER J. KASNER ELIAS 8. KIM CooLrey LLP 1299 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Suite 700 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 842-7800 Dated: November 18, 2025

Docket Entries

2025-11-24
Application (25A600) granted by Justice Alito extending the time to file until January 2, 2026.
2025-11-18
Application (25A600) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from December 3, 2025 to January 2, 2026, submitted to Justice Alito.

Attorneys

Raymon Walters
Ephraim Alexander McDowellCooley LLP, Petitioner
Ephraim Alexander McDowellCooley LLP, Petitioner
United States
D. John SauerSolicitor General, Respondent
D. John SauerSolicitor General, Respondent