Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. United States extends to the interpretation of federal Sentencing Guidelines for determining career offender status using a time-of-conviction or time-of-sentencing approach

No question identified. : 151 F.4th 577 (4th Cir. 2025). A copy of the opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit A. b. September 15, 2025: Issuance of a denial of a timely-filed petition for rehearing in the Fourth Circuit. c. December 2, 2025: Deadline for seeking extension of time within which to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. d. December 12, 2025: Expiration of time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, unless extended. 3. This extension is requested due to the demands of counsel’s other cases in this Court and others, and proximate argument dates in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in combination with holiday closures falling between now and the current due date. Specifically, counsel’s most recent certiorari petition in United States v. Eric Arthur Walton (no Supreme Court case number yet assigned) was just filed today— November 25, 2025. And counsel is arguing two cases back-to-back in the Fourth Circuit’s December argument session: oral argument in United States v. Jones, No. 23-4711 on December 11, 2025; and oral argument in United States v. Umeti, No. 244478, on December 12, 2025—the same day Mr. Nelson’s petition for certiorari is presently due. Between the demands of counsel’s other cases, court/office closures for the Thanksgiving holiday, and argument preparation for both the Jones and Umeti oral arguments, there will be insufficient time to complete Mr. Nelson’s petition for certiorari without an extension. 4. Petitioner intends to ask this Court to grant review on an important question splitting the courts of appeals: whether this Court’s decision in Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101 (2024) extends to the federal Sentencing Guidelines. In Brown, this Court held that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) requires sentencing courts to determine whether prior convictions count as sentenceenhancing “serious drug offenses” using a approach, as opposed to at the time of federal sentencing. 602 U.S. at 106. In so doing, Justice Alito explained why the ordinary Guidelines practice of using a approach was not relevant to ACCA: Brown also likens his interpretation to the “ordinary practice” of applying Guidelines sentencing enhancements as they exist at sentencing. But there is reason to doubt that the Guidelines practice is relevant here. That is because Congress has expressly directed courts to apply the Guidelines “in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(Gii). ACCA contains no similar instruction. 602 U.S. at 120, n.7 (citation omitted). Below, Mr. Nelson argued that if the Guidelines practice was not relevant to ACCA, as Brown made clear, then ACCA’s approach was not relevant to the Guidelines. 151 F.4th at 583. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the courts of appeals had split on their interpretation of this part of Brown. Id. (citing United States v. Minor, 121 F.4th 1085, 1092 (5th Cir. 2024) (adopting the time-of-sentencing approach for a Guidelines career offender analysis and observing that “the Court in Brown cast doubt on whether it would employ the approach in the Guidelines context”) and United States v. Drake, 126 F.4th 1242, 1245-46 (6th Cir. 2025) (adhering to the time-ofconviction approach adopted in United States v. Clark, 46 F.4th 404 (6th Cir. 2022), and explaining that “[n]othing in Brown's footnote undermines [Clark's] reasoning”)). The panel, incorrectly believing it needed to “adhere” to an earlier Fourth Circuit from 1997 on a different question, determined that the time-of-conviction approach was required for the guidelines in the Fourth Circuit. Jd. at 584. Under the approach Congress mandated for the Sentencing Guidelines, Mr. Nelson would not be a career offender because his prior conviction for distributing a schedule I or II controlled substance would be categorically overbroad. And under that approach, the district court committed procedural error by incor