Whether the warrantless collection, extraction, and forensic analysis of a person's shed DNA from discarded personal items constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment

No question identified. : APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME Under this Court’s Rule 13.5, Applicant Michael Sharpe respectfully requests a 30-day extension of time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari, to and including February 4, 2026. JUDGMENT FOR WHICH REVIEW IS SOUGHT The judgment for which review is sought is Connecticut v. Sharpe, 353 Conn. 564 (2025) (attached as Exhibit 1). JURISDICTION This Court will have jurisdiction over any timely petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The Connecticut Supreme Court issued its judgment on October 7, 2025. In accordance with Rule 13.5, this application is being filed more than 10 days before the current due date of January 5, 2026. REASONS JUSTIFYING AN EXTENSION OF TIME 1. This case presents important constitutional questions about how police may collect and analyze a person’s DNA. Below, the Connecticut Supreme Court ratified the warrantless collection, testing, and storage of Applicant Michael Sharpe’s DNA at time when he was, in the words of the dissenting justices, “indistinguishable from anyone else living freely in our society.” 353 Conn. 564 at 599. Police collected his trash, found a belt, located DNA on that belt, and then analyzed and uploaded that DNA to a database for purposes of identifying the sample against a crime scene sample—all without a warrant or probable cause. He was convicted of kidnapping on that basis. A number of circuits and states have approved similar investigatory techniques. Other courts, by contrast, hold that DNA extraction and the creation of a DNA profile from a blood sample on lawfully seized clothing constitutes a “separate search” because the defendant “retain[ed] a privacy interest.” United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 266, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2012). Those other courts are correct. A search violates the Fourth Amendment “when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); see also, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Here, police turned their attention to Mr. Sharpe only after they had investigated his half-brothers. Id. at 606. Police first surreptitiously collected the half-brothers’ DNA because they were identified as a potential match by a forensic genealogy company that partnered with police. Id. When the half-brothers’ DNA did not actually match the crime scene samples, police went back to the genealogy company for additional matches. Id. The genealogy company then identified Mr. Sharpe and another brother. Jd. Following the same playbook, police surreptitiously collected DNA samples from Mr. Sharpe and his other brother. Id. at 606-07. Mr. Sharpe was identified as a suspect based on a DNA sample police extracted and analyzed from a belt located during a surreptitious collection of Mr. Sharpe’s curbside trash. Jd. The DNA police pulled from the belt matched the crime scene samples. Police did not seek or obtain a warrant before extracting Mr. Sharpe’s DNA from the belt or before testing the DNA sample and attempting to match it against samples in the state’s CODIS database. Id. Mr. Sharpe was convicted of kidnapping after the trial court admitted this DNA evidence. Id. at 570— 71. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that because police lawfully obtained the belt, they could both collect and analyze the DNA sample shed on the belt without a warrant. The court determined that although (or perhaps because) DNA is involuntary and unavoidably shed, society would not recognize an expectation of privacy in DNA as reasonable. See id. at 576-77. Two justices dissented in relevant part. Writing for himself and Justice Ecker, Justice D’Auria argued that (1) extracting and (2) analyzing a person’s DNA each require one of the following: consent, suspicion, or a warrant. Id. at 665. The dissenters vehemently disputed that society does not recognize as reasonable a privacy interest in shed DNA. Id. An exte