Whether due process requires the government to take additional reasonable steps to provide actual notice of a deportation hearing beyond mailing notice to an alien's last known address when that notice is returned as undeliverable

No question identified. : 1. This case arises from respondent’s motion to dismiss his indictment for illegal reentry following a deportation order, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. Respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico. App., infra, 7a. He unlawfully entered the United States in 1992 and filed an asylum application with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 1993, falsely claiming that he was a citizen of Guatemala. Ibid. On his asylum application, he listed an address in Portland, Oregon (4037 N. Cleveland Ave.) as his address. Ibid. The INS mailed notices regarding respondent’s asylum application and work authorization to that address, instructing him to appear in person at the INS office in Portland in early 1994. App., infra, 7a. But when respondent appeared in person to pick up his work authorization papers, he presented false identification documents. Ibid. When confronted by the agency regarding the fraudulent documents, respondent admitted to the fraud and withdrew his asylum application, and the agency personally served him with an Order to Show Cause. Ibid. The show-cause order stated that respondent would later be notified of the date, time, and place of his deportation hearing, and that notice would be mailed to the address he had provided on his asylum application. Ibid. The show-cause order listed that address as “4037 N. Cleveland, Portland, OR, 97212” (thus omitting “Ave.” from what respondent had listed on his asylum application). Id. at 7a-8a. The show-cause order also informed respondent that he must notify the agency of any change of address, and that if he failed to appear at the deportation hearing, the immigration judge could order his deportation in absentia. Id. at 7a. The show-cause order was read to respondent in Spanish, and he acknowledged receipt by signing the document. Id. at 8a; id. at 33a (Bennett, J., dissenting). Soon thereafter, the INS moved to schedule the case for hearing. App., infra, at 8a. A copy of the scheduling motion was sent by regular mail to the address listed on the order, but it was returned by the U.S. Postal Service as “Not Deliverable As Addressed[,] Unable to Forward.” Ibid.; id. at 34a (Bennett, J., dissenting). The immigration court sent a notice of hearing -which contained the date, time, and location of the hearing -to the same address by certified mail. Id. at 8a (majority opinion). That notice was “Returned to Sender” as “Unclaimed.” MIbid.; id. at 35a (Bennett, J., dissenting). Four months later, the immigration court held the hearing. Id. at 8a (majority opinion). Respondent did not appear and was ordered deported in absentia. Ibid. Respondent was ultimately removed pursuant to that order in 2006, but by 2019, he had returned to the United States. Id. at 8a-9a. 2. a. In 2019, respondent was detained under the 1994 removal order and charged with one count of illegally reentering the United States following deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). App., infra, 8a-9a. He conditionally pleaded guilty, but he moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that he had not received adequate notice of the removal hearing and that the underlying removal order was therefore invalid. Id. at 9a. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the removal order was valid because the government sent its notice of hearing by certified mail to the last known address listed on his asylum application. Ibid. The district court concluded that the government’s approach was “reasonably calculated” to give notice to respondent and that respondent was not entitled to actual notice of his hearing. Ibid. b. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed. 105 F.4th 1118. In a per curiam opinion, the majority concluded that respondent’s deportation in absentia did not violate due process. Id. at 1121. It explained that the Ninth Circuit had previously concluded that the government’s compliance with the statutory notice requirements was constitutionally s