Whether appellate courts may review the genuineness of factual disputes in qualified immunity appeals based solely on video evidence, or only when the video utterly discredits the plaintiff's account

here is whether Scott authorized appellate courts to review the genuineness of factual disputes whenever video evidence exists in the record—as the Fifth Circuit has held—or only when a peak at such evidence “utterly discredits” the plaintiffs version of events and renders it “visible fiction,” see id. at 380, as at least the First, Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have held. 2. Petitioner Evan Norman is a private citizen who was removed from a restaurant and bar then beaten by two Harris County sheriffs deputies in the parking lot. Add. 2. He “suffered a fractured orbital rim and orbital roof, a broken nose, hemorrhaging in his sinus cavity, and subcutaneous emphysema.” Add. 3. Respondents Lee Ingle and Christopher Sutton are Harris County sheriffs deputies. Deputy Ingle removed Norman from the bar, instructed him to go home, and offered him the choice of leaving or being arrested for public intoxication. Add. 2. When Norman continued to ask for the deputies’ names and badge numbers, the deputies shoved him repeatedly. Norman resisted Deputy Ingle as he advanced on Norman and shoved him, and the deputies responded by punching Norman in the head repeatedly—Deputy Ingle at least ten times—until Norman was on the ground. Ibid. “Video evidence does not show that Norman resisted arrest while on the ground.” Add. 3. Yet Deputy Ingle continued to punch Norman in the head while kneeling on his arm. Ibid. Relevant here, Norman sued the deputies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force, failure to provide medical care, failure to intervene, and other constitutional violations. Add. 3. 3. The officers moved for summary judgment, “asserting qualified immunity among other defense.” Add. 3. The district court denied the deputies’ motions. Add. 3. The court found “genuine disputes of fact as to whether Norman posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,” whether he resisted arrest, and whether he was denied immediate medical attention. Jbid. Based on these factual disputes, the district court concluded that a jury should resolve whether the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity. Ibid. The Fifth Circuit reversed in a published opinion. The court acknowledged Norman’s argument that the court lacked jurisdiction because the district court found genuine disputes of material fact. Add. 4. But the court asserted jurisdiction to review solely because under established circuit precent, the panel could “review genuineness when, as here, video evidence is available.” Add. 4 (citing Argueta v. Jaradi, 86 F.4th 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 2023)). Applying that standard, the court concluded that “video evidence provides sufficient clarity” to resolve the dispute in the officers’ favor. Add. 6. This timely application follows. REASONS FOR GRANTING AN EXTENSION OF TIME The time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari should be extended for 30 days for three reasons: 1. The forthcoming petition is likely to be granted. First, the circuits are divided over whether Scott v. Harris permits appellate courts to review the genuineness of factual disputes in interlocutory qualified immunity appeals whenever video evidence exists, or only when video evidence so utterly discredits the plaintiffs account that no reasonable jury could believe it. The Fifth Circuit has expressly acknowledged that “Scott could be read to hold that we are empowered to review the genuineness of fact disputes only to determine whether video evidence ‘blatantly contradicts’ one party’s version of events,” but rejected that view. See Argueta v. Jaradi, 86 F.4th 1084,