Whether a state can be held vicariously liable under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act for medical care violations committed by private contractors in state prisons

No question identified. : 001a—037a, is reported at 154 F.4th 127 (8d Cir. 2025). The District Court’s memorandum, App., infra, 043a—069a, is not reported. The Court of Appeals entered judgment on October 8, 2025. So, unless extended, the current deadline to file a petition for a writ of certiorari is January 6, 2026. The jurisdiction of this Court would be invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 1. Respondent Jose Montanez allegedly suffered a medical episode while incarcerated in a Pennsylvania prison. He subsequently filed a lawsuit on his own behalf against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, several Commonwealth employees, a private company engaged by the Commonwealth to provide medical care to Commonwealth inmates, and several employees of that private company. His complaint contained, inter alia, claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). 2. The Commonwealth Defendants moved to dismiss that complaint in its entirety for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court granted that motion and dismissed all of Montanez’s claims with prejudice. 3. Montanez appealed that dismissal on his own behalf to the Third Circuit. But he subsequently obtained pro bono counsel, who filed the Opening Brief and Reply Brief on his behalf. 4. The Third Circuit then set the matter down for oral argument. Five days before that argument, the Third Circuit issued a letter stating that, “[a]t oral argument in this matter, the parties should be prepared to discuss . . . [t]he extent to which the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania] remains liable under [the ADA and RA] for the actions of private contractors providing medical services to inmates within state prisons.” App., infra, 071a—072a. 5. Neither Montanez nor his pro bono counsel had ever previously argued that the Commonwealth could or should be liable for ADA or RA violations committed by its medical contractors. Nevertheless—and not surprisingly in light of the Third Circuit’s letter—his pro bono counsel raised that argument in the first few seconds of her oral argument before the Third Circuit. 6. After oral argument, the Third Circuit ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing, inter alia, “[w]hether the Commonwealth is liable for violations of the [ADA or RA] caused by private contractors providing medical services to inmates within state prisons.” App., infra, 073a. 7. In their supplemental brief, the Commonwealth Defendants first argued that the Third Circuit had sua sponte “interjected” the vicarious-liability issue into the case in violation of United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 380 (2020). App., infra, 076a—078a. The Commonwealth Defendants also argued that holding the Commonwealth vicariously liable for ADA or RA violations committed by its medical contractors would violate the principle announced in Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998), and applied to the ADA and RA by the Sixth Circuit in Jones v. City of Detroit, Michigan, 20 F.4th 1117, 1121 (6th Cir. 2021), and by the Eleventh Circuit in Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 2022). App., infra, 078a—080a. 8. The Third Circuit later issued a precedential opinion reversing the District Court’s dismissal of Montanez’s claims. Along the way, that opinion held that the Commonwealth in fact could be liable for ADA and RA violations committed by its medical contractors. But the opinion did not address the Commonwealth Defendants’ argument under Sineneng-Smith, nor its argument under Gebser, Jones, and Ingram. 9. The Commonwealth Defendants believe this case warrants review by this Court on a writ of certiorari because the Third Circuit has, inter alia, so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power; entered a decision in conflict with decisions of other United States courts of ap