Whether a state election official can constitutionally exclude potential presidential electors from the ballot based on the perceived ineligibility of their pledged candidate's presidential candidacy

No question identified. : Respectfully submitted, WN RAT UV fOAE ylufd /s/ Nicholas Lupo NICHOLAS LUPO Petitioner Pro Se ‘s/ Matthew Stoneman MATTHEW STONEMAN Petitioner Pro Se {s/ David Price DAVID PRICE Petitioner Pro Se Cc: Zachary Barker Assistant Attorney General Zachary. Barker@ag.tn.gov Case: 24-6052 Document: 15-1 Filed: 05/07/2025 Page: 1 NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION No. 24-6052 FILED May 7, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tennessee Elections Division, Coordinator of Elections, in his official capacity, FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT NICHOLAS LUPO, et al., ) ) ) ) v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TRE HARGETT, Tennessee Secretary of State, in ) THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF his official capacity, and MARK GOINS, ) TENNESSEE ) ) ) ) Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; COLE and CLAY, Circuit Judges. Nicholas Lupo, Matthew Stoneman, and David Price, proceeding pro se, appeal the district court’s judgment dismissing their civil action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This case has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). Because the plaintiffs failed to state a claim, we affirm. In September 2024, the plaintiffs filed this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by Tre Hargett, the Tennessee Secretary of State, and Mark Goins, a Tennessee election official, in their official capacities. The plaintiffs alleged that they submitted “Nomination Papers” to the State to be placed on the ballot as “Elector Candidates” in the 2024 presidential election pledged to vote for Dr. Shiva Ayyadurai, an independent candidate born outside of the United States. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants denied them placement on the ballot as presidential electors—despite their otherwise (1 of 6) Case: 24-6052 Document: 15-1 Filed: 05/07/2025 Page: 2 No. 24-6052 -2meeting the requirements under state law—because Dr. Ayyadurai was not eligible to run for president because he is not a “naturally born” United States citizen. The crux of the plaintiffs’ argument seems to be that, although Dr. Ayyadurai may be ineligible to run for president, Tennessee lacked the legal authority to exclude the plaintiffs from the ballot as electors because a presidential election is technically used to select electors to the Electoral College, rather than the president and vice president directly. The plaintiffs therefore sought damages and a declaratory judgment that the State lacked subject-matter and personal jurisdiction to reject them as elector candidates despite their being pledged to an ineligible candidate and violated their rights by doing so. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), first arguing that the claims were moot and barred by sovereign immunity and that the district court should not interfere with an election that was already underway. They also argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under either the First or Fourteenth Amendment. The district court disagreed as to mootness and sovereign immunity and dismissed the complaint for failing to state a claim. On appeal, the plaintiffs primarily argue that the State could not deny them placement on the ballot as presidential electors, asserting that the potential ineligibility of their pledged candidate to hold the office of president was prematurely decided and is irrelevant in any case to whether they can appear as candidates for the Electoral College on the Tennessee ballot. In response, the State does not reassert its jurisdictional challenges, instead arguing that the district court correctly determined that the plaintiffs failed to state a First or Fourteenth Amendment claim. Although the election is now over, the parties do not address mootness. But because mootness implicates the court’s subject-matter